Networks, social information and compliance by Borzino, Natalia
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Networks, Social Information and Compliance” 
 
 
 
Natalia Leonor Borzino 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy 
 
 
School of Economics, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental 
Social Science, and Center for Competition Policy 
 
University of East Anglia 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is 
understood to recognize that its copyright rests with the author and that use of the any 
information derived there from must ne in accordance with the current UK Copyright 
Law. In addition, any quotation or extract must include full attribution. 
 
 2 
 
 
Natalia Leonor Borzino 
2016 
“Networks, Social Information and Compliance” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The work developed in my PhD on “Networks, Social Information and 
Compliance” focuses on compliance (voluntary and non), diffusion of information 
and spillovers in diverse network structures.  More specifically, we test 
experimentally how minimal social information is diffused through different 
network structures and its role on increasing the level of efficiency along with its 
positive effect on voluntary compliance of emergent social norms and tax 
compliance. In the first two chapters, we implement a networked version of the 
trust game with two senders and one receiver. We manipulate in a minimal way 
the social information available in the network and, the novelty of our work 
consists in the introduction of non-binding suggestion about the level of trust and 
trustworthiness, which is totally fair and (partially) efficient. It is also manipulated 
in the two studies the selection mechanism of the roles in the game by introducing 
social status. Our findings suggest that social information has a positive and 
significant effect on increasing the level of trust in the network. The non-binding 
suggestion has also a positive and significant effect on individual decisions. In the 
last chapter, we study in a laboratory experiment how tax compliance information 
is diffused in a fixed-six-nodes circle network. The game has four information 
conditions: No Info, Full Info, Positive Info and Negative Info. In the No info 
treatment, subjects get individual information about whether they were audited, 
the outcome of it and her final payoff. In the Positive Info (Negative Info) 
treatment, participants get information whether adjacent connected nodes were 
audited and found compliant (noncompliant). In the Full Info, participants get 
both positive and negative signals. We control for the effect of signals on 
participants’ beliefs on the ex-ante fixed and unknown audit probability by an 
incentive compatible mechanism. The tax rate and fine rate are fixed and known 
by the subjects. Our findings suggest that positive and negative signals have a 
significant effect in the levels of reporting and compliance at individual level. 
Indeed, diffusion of non-strong negative signal (one bad example) has a negative 
effect on individuals’ tax compliance. The diffusion of strong positive signals 
(two good examples) is required to generate any increase in compliance decisions 
within networks.		
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Introduction 	
 
The following thesis developed during my PhD studies on “Networks, Social 
Information and Compliance” focuses on compliance (voluntary and non), 
diffusion of information and spillovers in diverse network structures. More 
specifically, we test experimentally how minimal information travels through 
different network structures and its role on increasing the level of efficiency along 
with its positive effect on voluntary compliance of emergent social norms and tax 
compliance. This is particularly important because firms or individuals do not 
make decisions in isolation, but instead they take into account the behavior and 
experiences of their rivals or partners in the same network. 
 
In the first chapter of this dissertation, we conduct a controlled laboratory 
experiment to investigate trust and trustworthiness in a networked investment 
game in which two senders interact with a receiver. We investigate to what extent 
senders and receivers comply with an exogenous and non-binding 
recommendation. We also manipulate the level of information available to senders 
regarding receiver’s behavior in the network. We compare a baseline treatment in 
which senders are only informed about the actions and outcomes of their own 
investment games to two information treatments. In the reputation treatment, 
senders receive ex ante information regarding the average amount returned by the 
receiver in the previous period. In the transparency treatment, each sender 
receives ex post additional information regarding the returning decision of the 
receiver to the other sender in the network. Across all treatments and for both 
senders and receivers, the non-binding rule has a significant and positive impact 
on individual decisions. Providing senders with additional information regarding 
receiver’s behavior affects trust at the individual level, but leads to mixed results 
at the aggregate level. Our findings suggest that reputation building, as well as 
allowing for social comparison could be efficient ways for receivers to improve 
trust within networks. 
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In the second chapter, we investigate trust and trustworthiness in a three-node 
network in which two senders  (peripheral players) interact with a receiver 
(central player). We manipulate endogenously the social status of the players by 
allocating the central roles by merit (deservedness) as proxy of high status 
legitimacy. Indeed, and following Eckel et al. (2010), best performers in a trial 
phase get the role of high status receivers, while bottom performers get the role of 
low status senders. The aim is to study how differences in status as well as 
minimal manipulation of social information have an impact on investment and 
returning decisions. As in the first chapter of this thesis, we also investigate the 
compliance to an exogenous and totally fair recommendation about the proportion 
to invest and return. We compare a baseline merit treatment (no social info) with 
two social information treatments: Reputation merit and Transparency merit.  
 
We observe that the exogenous recommendation has a positive and significant 
impact in the investment decisions, but it does not have an impact on the 
receivers’ returning decisions. Indeed, trustworthy behavior is not built over time 
across treatments, which implies a lack of reciprocity from the high status 
receivers towards the low status senders. Low status senders tend to penalize the 
high status receivers’ misbehavior by increasing the cases in which no trust is 
displayed. In the baseline merit, the proportion of observations in which nothing 
was sent reaches almost to half of interactions (49,38%), while in the reputation 
merit and in the transparency merit treatment to 29.17% and 26.61% respectively. 
Therefore, our findings suggest that social information seems to be critical in 
increasing significantly the level of trust at individual levels, however not the 
levels of trustworthiness. In fact, social comparison and reputation building 
increase the level of trust in networks characterized by differences in status. 
 
In the last chapter, we study in a laboratory experiment how tax compliance 
information travels through a fixed-six-nodes circle network structure.  This game 
introduces four information conditions: No Info, Full Info, Positive Info and 
Negative Info. In the No info treatment, subjects get individual information about 
whether they were audited, the outcome of it and her final payoff. In the Positive 
Info (Negative Info) treatment, participants get information about whether 
adjacent connected nodes were audited and found compliant (or noncompliant). In 
 9 
the Full Info, participants get both positive and negative signals. We specifically 
control for the effect of signals on participants’ beliefs on the ex-ante fixed and 
unknown audit probability by asking them using an incentive compatible 
mechanism. We keep the tax rate and fine rate fixed and known by the subjects. 
Receiving positive and negative signals have a significant effect in the levels of 
reporting and compliance at individual level. However, results are mixed at the 
aggregate level. Our findings suggest that the diffusion of one negative signal (a 
bad example) has a negative effect on individuals’ tax compliance. The diffusion 
of strong positive signals (two good examples) is required to generate any 
increase in compliance decisions within network. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Trust is an essential component of most social and economic interactions. 
Because of trust, agents are willing to exchange, even in situations where standard 
theory would predict no exchange at all. For that reason, trusting behaviors have 
been extensively documented in the economic literature. The most popular 
experimental game used to address this issue is without doubt the two players 
investment game (Berg et al., 1995). This experimental setting allows the 
investigation of trust – and trustworthiness – in a bilateral relationship between a 
single sender and a single receiver. However, there are many examples of 
economic interactions in which several senders interact with the same receiver 
and where the information available to the actors involved is not complete, but 
partial. This is the case of private agents interacting with a government. One 
example in which trust is involved in the relationship between agents and 
authorities is the payment of taxes. Private agents decide to give part of their 
earnings in the forms of voluntary or involuntary taxes, expecting to receive 
efficient and fair benefits from the system in return (Andreoni et al., 1998; Feld 
and Frey, 2002; Hofmann et al., 2008; Li et al., 2011). The trusting decision of 
private agents is directly related to economic and non-economic factors, which 
determine the behavioural relationship between them and the government (Feld 
and Frey, 2007; Torgler, 2007). One of the most evident economic factor would 
be the presence of tax legislation that sets exogenous rules to both tax payers and 
tax authority. Another factor would be that agents could access information 
regarding the outcome of previous interactions between the government and other 
agents. 
Recent networked extensions of the trust game have indeed demonstrated the 
comparative nature of trust: one’s decision to trust may be affected by the 
experience of others (Barrera and Buskens, 2009; Buskens et al., 2010; Cassar and 
Rigdon, 2011). In this current study, we address two important features that may 
affect trusting behaviors in a three player networked investment game with two 
senders and one receiver. First, we manipulate the amount and the nature of 
information that the senders have about the performance of the receiver. Second, 
we investigate to what extent the implementation of an exogenous, non-binding 
and weakly framed rule influences both trust and trustworthiness. 
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Some recent experimental studies have addressed the impact of information flows 
on trust and trustworthiness in network embedded settings. Buskens et al. (2010) 
analyse an investment game where two senders repeatedly face the same receiver. 
Cassar and Rigdon (2011) also implement repeated three player investment games 
with a stranger matching protocol. Both experimental settings compare two 
information conditions. In the first condition each sender only observes the 
actions and outcomes of her own investment game, resulting in a situation 
comparable to the standard two player investment game. In the full information 
condition, additional information is provided to senders: the amount invested by 
the other sender, as well as the amount returned to the other sender. The 
availability of complete information on third-party interaction has a dramatic 
impact on cooperation. Both trust and trustworthiness tend to increase with full 
information. Real-life examples involving complete information over interactions 
in a network are however not so common. Most of the time, one could expect to 
face situations where the information is only incomplete. In our study, we 
investigate the impact on minimal additional information on trust and 
trustworthiness. More precisely, in the different treatments, we provide to the 
senders the minimal information about the decisions of the receiver – the amount 
returned or the average amount returned to both senders – in previous interactions 
within the network, without revealing the actions of fellow senders. 
In this study, we also address voluntary compliance to exogenous norms. This 
research question is directly related to the recent experimental literature 
investigating cheating and lying behaviors (Serra-Garcia et al., 2011; Erat and 
Gneezy, 2012; Rosaz and Villeval, 2012; Fischbacher and Utikal, 2013; López-
Pérez and Spiegelman, 2013; Gneezy et al., 2013; Cappelen et al., 2013; Reuben 
and Stephenson, 2013; Xiao, 2013). Experimental studies have shown that 
individuals may be willing to bear monetary cost to display honest behaviors, 
suggesting the presence of aversion to dishonesty (Gneezy, 2005; Sanchez-Pages 
and Vorsatz, 2007; Hurkens and Kartik, 2009; Lundquist et al., 2009; Fischbacher 
and Heusi, 2013). There exists a direct relationship between trust and rule 
compliance. To follow-up with our previous example, empirical studies have 
shown that trust in authority is positively and significantly related to – voluntary – 
tax compliance (Torgler, 2002 and 2003; Torgler and Schneider, 2004 ; Halla, 
2010; Li et al, 2011; Doerrenberg and Peichl, 2013). This finding suggests that by 
increasing the level of trust, authorities could find an efficient and effective way 
to ensure tax compliance and limit the use of costly enforcement actions like 
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audits (Listokin and Schizer, 2012; Luttmer and Singhal, 2014). By analyzing 
trust, we explore one of the major components of tax morale, which is defined as 
the intrinsic motivation of paying taxes, and helps to deter tax evasion. 
In this work, we investigate the interaction between trust, trustworthiness, and the 
presence of an exogenous, non-binding rule, which is fair and efficient for both 
senders and receiver. We implement a repeated three-player investment game 
where two senders face the same receiver. Participant in the role of sender 
chooses a proportion of her endowment to forgo. This amount is multiplied and 
received by the receiver. The receiver decides then how much to return to the 
sender. In our experimental setting, both senders and receivers face a random 
suggested rule regarding the proportion to send, or to send back to the partner. 
The rule is a non-binding signal, which is also private information and weakly 
framed in the instructions. We are interested in how participants in our experiment 
follow the norm suggested by the signal, making compliance explicit. 
Besides, by implementing three different treatments (information conditions), we 
want to examine the effect in the level of senders’ trust and receiver 
trustworthiness when the available information changes, and how different 
policies alter performance, using as proxies the level of effort and the level of 
trust. 
In the baseline treatment, at the end of each period, participants are informed of 
the outcome of their own interaction only. The participants play twenty periods, in 
the same role following a partner matching protocol at a cohort level. To the 
baseline, we add two additional treatments that provide senders with new 
information. In the reputation treatment, senders get ex ante information regarding 
receiver’s trustworthiness before choosing an amount to send. This information 
consists in the average amount send back by the receiver to both of the senders 
associated to her in the previous period; in a sense, this is the minimal 
informational that a sender may get about the past performance of receiver. In the 
transparency treatment, we aim to analyze how perception of equity and fairness 
affects trust after knowing ex-post the amount of resources sent by the receiver to 
each sender in the group in that period; again, this is the minimal ex-post 
information senders may get about their receiver’s current performance. 
Our paper is closely related to Buskens et al. (2010) and Cassar and Rigdon 
(2011) that also investigate trust and trustworthiness in a three player networked 
investment game. Our experimental framework differs however from these 
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studies in several aspects. First, both senders and receivers face a rule or signal, 
which is fair and efficient relative to the equilibrium of the game, suggesting the 
amount to send or to return. This allows us to investigate voluntary compliance to 
exogenous norms. Second, while previous experiments have examined the impact 
of full information flows across network, we only provide senders with partial 
information regarding the outcome of previous interactions within the network. 
To anticipate our results, we observe that both ex ante and ex post information on 
receiver’s behavior significantly impact sender’s investment decision at the 
individual level. Results are however mixed at the aggregate level. The average 
level of trust is higher in the transparency treatment compared to the baseline and 
the reputation treatment. This finding suggests that in our experimental 
framework, allowing for ex post social comparison is more effective than 
providing ex ante information on receiver’s level of trustworthiness. Contrasting 
with the previous literature, we do not observe any impact of the provision of 
additional information on trustworthiness. Finally, individual decisions from both 
senders and receivers are significantly affected by the presence of a non-binding 
exogenous recommendation. 
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our 
experimental design and procedures. Section 3 reports the experimental results. 
Finally, section 4 concludes this paper. 
 
Experimental design and procedures 
 
2.1. The three players trust game 
 
The standard trust game first introduced by Berg et al. (1995) concentrates on 
interactions in a two-node network. One node is occupied by a first mover or 
sender, and the other node by a second mover or receiver. In the first stage, the 
first mover decides how much of her endowment to send to the second mover. 
The second mover receives that amount multiplied by a factor k, with k>1. In the 
second stage, the second mover decides how much to send back to the first mover. 
We implement a three-node networked investment game that has already been 
addressed in the literature (e.g. Buskens et al., 2010; Cassar and Rigdon, 2011). 
Two senders interact with the same receiver (see figure 1). The game consists of 
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two simultaneous trust games. The two senders decide of a proportion of their 
endowment to invest. The receiver receives separately these amounts multiplied 
by four and decides for each receiver of a proportion to send back. Both trust 
games are separable in the sense that the decision of the receiver for one sender is 
conditioned only by the amount received from this sender. The presence of a 
networked structure therefore does not directly affect the outcomes of the trust 
games. However, in some treatments senders can receive information regarding 
actions across the network. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A: The three-node network of two senders (S1 and S2) and one receiver (R). 
 
At the beginning of the experiment, all participants are randomly assigned to a 
role (sender or receiver) and a cohort of 6 participants. This cohort includes four 
senders and two receivers. Along the twenty rounds of the experiment, 
participants keep their role. At the beginning of each round, two three-node 
networks are formed in the cohort. The four participants in the role of sender are 
randomly matched with one of the two participants in the role of receiver. 
Because the matching process is applied within and not between cohorts, each 
cohort corresponds to an independent observation. The game is repeated over 
twenty rounds. Each round consists of five different stages. Table A displays the 
basic sequence of the game. Table	A:	Proceeding	of	an	experimental	round	
1st stage: 
Senders 
2nd stage: 
Senders 
3rd stage: 
Senders 
4th stage: 
Receiver 
5th stage: 
Receiver 
Real-Effort 
Task 
Signal 1: die Trust 
(X) 
Signal 2: die Trustworthiness 
(Y) 
 
1st stage – Real effort stage: At the beginning of each round, senders perform in a 
real-effort task for one minute. This task is implemented so that participants earn 
R			
S1   S2   
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their own endowment before investing it in the trusting decision1. It consists in 
adding two-digit numbers for one minute. For each addition correctly solved, 
sender’s endowment increases by 2 ECU. An upper limit is defined, so that 
endowment cannot exceed 10 ECU. Receivers do not participate to this task and 
receive a fixed endowment of 5 ECU. 
2nd stage – Signal for sending decision: Each Sender throws a virtual die and get a 
non-binding signal (see section 2.2) about the proportion of endowment she 
should send to the receiver. 
3rd stage – Sending decision: Each sender j decides of a proportion 𝑋! of her 
endowment to send to the receiver. She can choose a proportion to send in {0%; 
20%; 40%; 60%; 80%; 100%}. The amount sent is multiplied by four and 
received by the second mover. 
4th stage – Signal for returning decision: The receiver observes both amounts 
received from the senders she is matched with. She then throws for each sender a 
virtual die and get non-binding signals (see section 2.2) about the proportion of 
endowment she should return to each sender. 
5th stage – Returning decision: The receiver decides for each sender j of a 
proportion 𝑌!  from the amount received from j to return. She can choose a 
proportion to return in {0%; 20%; 40%; 60%; 80%; 100%}. 
At the end of the period, participants are informed of the outcome of the game. 
The receiver observes information on both trust games, whereas senders are only 
displayed the actions and outcomes from the trust game they have played. 
The game described above corresponds to our baseline treatment. In two other 
treatments, additional information is provided to senders. We further describe 
both information treatments in section 2.3. 
 
2.2. The Signal 
In our experimental framework, both senders and receivers face a non-binding 
recommendation before taking their decisions. The level of recommendation S is 
determined by the outcome D of a virtual six-sided die (see table 2). The value of 
the signal is then defined as: 𝑆 = 0.2 ⋅ (𝐷 − 1) 																																																								
1 See Houser and Xiao (2014) for a discussion of “house money effects” in trust games. 
 18 
The signal therefore follows a discrete uniform distribution: S ~ DU(6, 0, 0.2). 
Since the beginning of the experiment, all participants know the distribution of the 
recommendation S. Table	B:	Outcome	of	the	die	and	corresponding	recommendation	
Outcome of the die: 1 2 3 4 5 6 
% to keep 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 
% to send to the receiver 
       or 
% to send back to the sender 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
 
Assuming that players are rational and only aim at maximizing own profit, the inclusion 
of a non-binding recommendation does not alter theoretical predictions. The subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium can be solved by backward induction. Receiver maximizes her 
profit by keeping for herself the full amount received from the sender. Considering this, 
the sender does not invest any amount. The equilibrium is therefore characterized by an 
absence of interaction, and payoffs equal initial endowments for both players. 
Let’s consider the situation where both sender and receiver fully comply with their 
respective signal. The realized recommendation S takes value 𝑆! ∈ 0 ;  0.2 ;  0.4 ; 0.6 ; 0.8 ; 1  with fixed probability 𝑝! = !! .  The expected value of 
the exogenous recommendation is then 50%: 
 𝐸 𝑆 = 𝑝! ⋅ 𝑆! = 16!!!! ⋅ 𝑆! = 0.5
!
!!!  
 
Let e be the initial endowment of the sender. In a situation of full compliance, i.e. 
the decisions from the sender (X) and from the receiver (Y) are fully conditioned 
on the outcome of the die, E[X]=E[Y]=0.5. The expected profits of the complying 
sender (𝜋!!) and the complying receiver (𝜋!!) can therefore be expressed as: 𝐸 𝜋!! = 𝐸 𝑒 − 𝑋𝑒 + 4𝑋𝑒 ⋅ 𝑌 = 1.5𝑒 
           𝐸 𝜋!! = 𝐸 4𝑋𝑒 ⋅ 1− 𝑌 + 5 = 𝑒 + 5 
 
Endowment e is earned by senders at the beginning of each period through a real-
effort stage. The implementation of this stage only aims at avoiding windfall 
money effect, i.e. individual decision being influenced by the fact that senders do 
not consider the money they invest as theirs. We set an upper limit to the 
endowment corresponding to a performance of five additions or more in the real-
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effort task. This threshold has been implemented to limit heterogeneity in sender’s 
endowment. Indeed, a large majority of the participants to the addition task 
manage to reach this threshold within a minute2. Interestingly, in the presence of a 
maximal endowment, the expected profits of a complying sender and a complying 
receiver are equal:  𝐸 𝜋!! 𝑒 = 10 = 𝐸 𝜋!! 𝑒 = 10 = 15 
The exogenous rule could therefore be considered as fair, in the sense that the 
expected profit of both parties are equal, provided that they perfectly comply to 
the rule over all periods. Furthermore, the resulting outcomes would be 
significantly higher for both parties than those implied by the Nash equilibrium 
where for which is displayed. 
 
2.3. Information treatments 
 
In this experiment, we manipulate the information available to the senders across 
three different treatments. In the baseline treatment, senders do not receive 
information on receiver’s past behavior in previous rounds before taking their 
investment decision, and only receive feedback regarding their own trust game at 
the end of the period. This experimental framework is close from the “partial 
information” condition investigated in Cassar and Rigdon (2011). In two other 
treatments, we provide to the senders additional information regarding senders’ 
behavior within the network. Unlike previous experimental studies that 
concentrate on situations of full information, we investigate the role of partial 
information on trust and trustworthiness. 
In the reputation treatment, senders receive additional information before reaching 
their investment decision. This ex ante information regarding the receiver’s 
reputation corresponds to the average proportion returned in the previous round 
by the receiver they are matched with in that round3. Senders do not get separate 
information regarding both amounts received and returning decisions taken by the 
receiver in the previous round. We therefore consider this information as minimal. 																																																								
2 In our data, across all treatments and periods, senders earn the maximal endowment of 10 ECU 
in 96.94% of the cases. 
3 Assume that a receiver returned 20% to one sender and 40% to the other sender in the first round. 
At the beginning of the second round, the two senders that will be associated to that receiver will 
observe a reputation of 30% before making their investment choice. 
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In the transparency treatment, senders receive additional information at the end of 
each round. This ex post information corresponds to the outcome of the other trust 
game in the network. More precisely, each sender observes the proportion that the 
receiver returned to herself, but also the proportion returned to the other sender. 
This information is minimal in the sense that they do not observe how much the 
other sender invested. 
 
2.4. Procedures 
 
All the experimental sessions were conducted at ESSEXLab in the University of 
Essex. We electronically recruited 108 participants, mainly business and 
economics undergraduate students, all inexperienced in trust games. For each 
treatment, we collected data from six independent observations of six participants. 
On average, a session lasted 100 minutes, including initial instructions, quiz, trial 
phase, final questionnaire and payment of the subjects. The average payment was 
around £12.50, including a show up fee of £5. The instructions were read aloud. 
The only difference in the instructions was the information available to them 
according to each treatment. The experiment was computerized using Z-TREE 
(Fischbacher, 2007). 	
3. Results 
 
3.1. Trust and trustworthiness across treatment 
3.1.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 reports summary statistics regarding average decisions of both 
senders and receivers. Throughout this paper we define “trust” as the proportion 
of endowment sent by the first mover and “trustworthiness” as the proportion of 
the received amount returned by the second mover. Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney 
tests are run on independent observations (cohorts) to test for significant 
differences between treatments. 
The upper panel of table 1 displays outcomes for senders in total and for 
each treatment. The first column displays the average proportion sent. Trust is in 
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average higher in the transparency treatment than in the baseline treatment 
(p=0.0372) and the reputation treatment (p=0.0483). There is no significant 
difference between the proportion sent by first movers in the baseline and the 
reputation treatments (p=0.2461). The second column considers only the positive 
proportions, excluding all interactions where the first mover decided to send 
nothing. Senders’ decisions do not significantly differ between treatments in this 
case. This finding suggests that the higher level of trust observed in the 
transparency treatment compared to both other treatments is mainly lead by a 
lower share of senders showing no trust at all.  
The third column of table 1 confirms this assertion as the proportion of 
interactions, in which no trust is displayed – no amount sent – is lower in the 
transparency treatment (17.92%) than in the baseline treatment (24.84%) and the 
reputation treatment (28.75%). Furthermore, we observe large differences 
between treatments in the occurrence of situations where receivers face no choice 
at all, i.e. both senders do not send anything in the same period. This situation 
occurs for 7 out of 240 observations (2.92%) in the transparency treatment. This 
figure is larger in the baseline treatment with 15 out of 240 observations (6.25%) 
and much larger in the reputation treatment with 32 out of 240 observations 
(13.33%). 		 	
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Trust  ̶  (Proportion X sent by senders) 
 Proportion 
sent 
(Including 
X=0) 
Proportion 
sent 
(X>0 
only) 
Proportion 
of X=0 
Average profit of 
sender  
(in £ / $) 
     
Total 0.3879 
(0.3213) 
0.5093 
(0.2715) 
23.84% £4.50 / $7.36 
(2.26)   (3.69) 
Baseline 0.3795 
(0.3206) 
0.5050 
(0.2707) 
24.84% £4.66 / $7.63 
(2.52)    (4.12) 
Reputation 0.3454 
(0.3165) 
0.4848 
(0.2700) 
28.75% £4.46 / $7.31 
(1.98)     (3.23) 
Transparency      0.4388 ** 
(0.3206) 
0.5345 
(0.2720) 
  17.92% *    £4.35 / $7.14  
(2.24)    (3.66) 
     
Trustworthiness ̶  (Proportion Y returned by receivers) 
 Proportion 
returned 
(Including 
X=0) 
Proportion 
returned 
(X>0 
only) 
Proportion 
of Y=0 
(X>0 only) 
Average profit of 
receiver (in £ / $) 
     
Total 0.2518 
(0.2839) 
0.3305 
(0.2825) 
24.98% £6.07 / $9.94  
(3.99)    (6.54) 
Baseline 0.2833 
(0.3156) 
0.3767 
(0.3118) 
24.10% £5.80 / $9.50 
(4.15)    (6.79) 
Reputation 0.2288 
(0.2697) 
0.3211 
(0.2692) 
25.44% £5.57 / $9.12 
(3.61)    (5.91) 
Transparency 0.2433 
(0.2613) 
0.2964 
(0.2596) 
25.38%          £6.84 / $11.20 * 
(4.10)    (6.54) 
Notes : Standard deviations are displayed in parentheses ; Stars report significance level 
from Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney tests run on independent observations (cohorts of 6 
participants) to confirm differences with the baseline treatment. 
* 90% significance ** 95% significance *** 99% significance 
 
The lower panel of table 1 reports receivers’ returning decisions. Considering 
only the interactions for which receivers made a decision (X>0), the proportion 
returned in the transparency and the reputation treatments tends to be lower than 
in the baseline treatment. These differences are however not statistically 
significant (p=0.3367 and p=0.1495 respectively). 
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Result 1: Senders make positive offers more often in the transparency treatment 
than in the baseline and reputation treatments. There is no significant difference 
across treatments regarding the returning decision of receivers. 
Senders make offers more often in the transparency treatment, even though 
receivers do not return more (and return even less, although not significantly). For 
that reason, the average payoff of senders do not differ across treatments, whereas 
the payoff of receivers is about 18% higher in the transparency treatment than in 
the baseline treatment (p=0.0782). 
 
Result 2: In average, receivers earn higher profits in the transparency treatment. 
The average profit of senders does not significantly differ across treatments. 
 
3.1.2 Trust 
Figure 1 displays for each treatment the average proportion of endowment sent by 
first movers across periods. It suggests that previously observed treatment 
differences in trusting behavior are mainly lead by differences in dynamics. Trust 
tends to decrease over time in the baseline treatment (Spearman’s Rho=-0.3860, 
p=0.0928) and in the reputation treatment (Spearman’s Rho=-0.5017, p=0.0242). 
This is not the case for the transparency treatment in which trust does not 
significantly vary over time (Spearman’ Rho=0.2012, p=0.3950). 
 
 
Figure 1 – Proportion of endowment sent (Trust) across periods 	
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Consistent with Result 1, treatment differences in the level of trust merely reflect 
differences in the proportion of senders keeping their whole endowment. Figure 2 
displays these proportions for the first 10 periods and the last 10 periods of the game. 
 
 
Figure	2	–	Proportion	of	situations	with	no	trust	at	all	
 
 
It appears that the share of senders showing no trust tends to increase over time in 
the baseline (Spearman’s Rho=0.6739, p=0.0011) and in the reputation 
(Spearman’s Rho=0.7855, p=0.0000) treatments. This share tends to decrease 
over time in the transparency treatment, although not significantly (Spearman’s 
Rho=-0.2843, p=0.2244). 
Result 3: Trust does not vary over time in the transparency treatment, whereas it 
decreases in the baseline and reputation treatments. 
Table 2 reports estimates of the determinants of trust4 at the individual level. 
Controlling for amounts sent and received in previous period, outcome of the die, 
time trend and demographic variables, we observe in column (1) that trust is 
larger in the transparency treatment than in both the baseline and the reputation 
treatment. Sender’s trust tends to increase with the proportion received back in t-1 
and to decrease over time. We also observe that the outcome of the die is a 
significant determinant of the amount sent by first movers. Compliance to the rule 
is discussed in further details in section 3.3. 																																																									
4 Senders could send between 0% and 100% of their initial endowment with increments of 20%. 
Given the discrete nature of the corresponding variable, we decide to run random-effect ordered 
probit rather than standard random-effect regression. 
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Table 2 
Random-effects ordered probit regressions for trust - pooled sample 
 Proportion Xit sent by sender 
 (1) (2) 
Lag Proportion Sent (Xit-1) 0.811*** 
(0.206) 
0.836*** 
(0.198) 
Lag Proportion Received (Yit-1) 0.638*** 
(0.088) 
0.566*** 
(0.099) 
Die Outcome (Rule) 0.138*** 
(0.032) 
0.143*** 
(0.033) 
Baseline Treatment Ref. Ref. 
   
Reput. Treatment  -0.063 
(0.208) 
-0.388* 
(0.243) 
Reput. Treatment  × Reputation of the receiver - 1.298** 
(0.559) 
Transp. Treatment 0.303** 
(0.125) 
- 
Transp. Treatment × Received as much as other 
sender 
- 0.154 
(0.115) 
Transp. Treatment × Received less than other 
sender 
- 0.286** 
(0.122) 
Transp. Treatment × Received more than other 
sender 
- 0.140 
(0.131) 
Period Number -0.016** 
(0.007) 
-0.015** 
(0.006) 
Female -0.237 
(0.178) 
-0.272 
(0.167) 
Age 0.041 
(0.033) 
0.039 
(0.030) 
British -0.066 
(0.204) 
-0.081 
(0.197) 
# observations 1366 1366 
# individuals 72 72 
Log pseudo-likelihood -2089.7483 -2065.1954 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on the independent observation level 
(cohorts of six individuals) 
* 90% significance ** 95% significance *** 99% significance 
 
To reach a better understanding of treatment differences in the level of trust, we 
include additional control in column (2) of table 2. Although trust in the 
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reputation treatment is in aggregate not different than in the baseline treatment, 
regression results suggest that the reputation of the receiver matters. The 
reputation treatment dummy variable is associated to a negative and significant 
coefficient, whereas the coefficient associated to the interaction variable 
reputation treatment × reputation of the receiver is significantly positive. This 
finding suggests that when facing a receiver with low reputation, participants send 
in average less than senders in the baseline treatment. Sender’s trust increases 
however dramatically with the reputation of the receiver. Because of 
heterogeneity in receivers’ reputation, we do not observe in aggregate any 
significant difference in trust between baseline and reputation treatments. These 
findings are discussed in subsection 3.2.1. Column (2) of table 2 also emphasizes 
the role of social comparison in the transparency treatment. Only participants who 
received back in previous period a lower proportion than the other sender tend to 
send more than in the baseline treatment. Further investigation of the role of 
information in the transparency treatment is provided in subsection 3.2.2. 
 
3.1.2 Trustworthiness 	
Figure 3 displays for each treatment the proportion of amount received that 
senders return in average over time. Consistent with result 1, we do not observe 
any treatment difference in average return. Trustworthiness decreases 
significantly over time in the baseline treatment (Spearman’s Rho=-0.5260, 
p=0.0172) and does not significantly vary overtime in both reputation 
(Spearman’s Rho=-0.3190, p=0.1704) and transparency (Spearman’s Rho=-
0.3054, p=0.1904) treatments. 
Column (1) of table 3 reports estimates of the determinants of trustworthiness at 
the individual level across treatments. We do not observe any difference in 
receiver’s individual decision between treatments. The variables Lagged total 
proportion sent and Lagged total proportion returned correspond to the sum of 
the outcomes of both interactions in previous period. Considering all treatments, 
we observe reciprocity from the receiver, in the sense that the proportion returned 
increases with the amount received. The coefficient associated to the lagged total 
amount returned is positive and significant, suggesting that trustworthiness builds 
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over time. As it was the case for senders, the recommended rule associated to the 
die plays a positive and largely significant role in receiver’s returning decision. 		
 
Figure 3 – Proportion returned (Trustworthiness) across periods 
 
Columns (2) (3) and (4) display results of within-treatment regressions. We do 
observe that determinants of trustworthiness vary between treatments. 
Reciprocity, i.e. a positive effect of the amount returned on the proportion 
returned, appears only in the reputation and transparency treatments. Consistent 
with the comparative trust hypothesis formulated in Cassar and Rigdon (2011)5, 
we observe that in the reputation treatment that returning decision to one sender is 
affected by the other sender’s investment decision. A lower amount invested by a 
receiver would make the offer of the other receiver look more generous. 
Returning decision would then be based on the relative, rather than the absolute 
investment decision of senders. However, we do not find support for this 
hypothesis in the baseline and the transparency treatment. In all treatments, the 
outcome of the die plays a significant role in returning decisions. 
Result 4: Although we do not observe aggregate difference in trustworthiness 
between treatments, we observe reciprocity in the information treatments only. In 
the reputation treatment, reciprocity is based on comparative trust 																																																								
5 In a networked trust games with two senders and one receiver, Cassar and Rigdon find evidence 
that the return decisions by receivers depend in part on the investment behavior along the other 
link in the network. 
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 Table	3:	Random-effects	ordered	probit	regressions	for	trustworthiness	–	Treatment-specific	samples	
 Proportion Yi returned by receiver  
 (1) Pooled 
(2) 
Baseline 
(3) 
Reputation 
(4) 
Transparency 
Proportion sent by sender 0.411* 
(0.219) 
-0.037 
(0.393) 
0.755*** 
(0.170) 
0.671* 
(0.376) 
Proportion sent by other 
sender 
0.016 
(0.122) 
0.137 
(0.193) 
-0.477** 
(0.230) 
0.176 
(0.147) 
Lag. Total Proportion Sent 0.044 
(0.100) 
-0.124 
(0.192) 
0.303*** 
(0.101) 
-0.019 
(0.196) 
Lag. Total Proportion 
Returned 
0.156** 
(0.066) 
0.160* 
(0.084) 
0.213 
(0.170) 
0.176 
(0.147) 
Die Outcome (Rule) 0.220*** 
(0.029) 
0.164*** 
(0.043) 
0.225*** 
(0.043) 
0.283*** 
(0.064) 
Baseline Treatment Ref. - - - 
Reput. Treatment  -0.205 
(0.326) - - - 
Transp. Treatment -0.256 
(0.238) - - - 
Period Number -0.016** 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.031*** 
(0.006) 
-0.019 
(0.021) 
Female 0.390 
(0.324) 
0.645 
(0.689) 
0.937 
(0.735) 
-0.288 
(0.064) 
Age 0.025 
(0.022) 
-0,019 
(0.032) 
0.159 
(0.273) 
0.101 
(0.108) 
British -0.272 
(0.317) 
0.427 
(0.513) 
-0.701 
(0.750) 
0.067 
(0.504) 
# observations 1041 342 323 376 
# groups 36 12 12 12 
Log pseudo-likelihood -1540.9140 -548.3909 -443.7712 -518.6968 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on the independent observation level 
(cohorts of six individuals) 
* 90% significance ** 95% significance *** 99% significance 
 
3.2. The role of partial information in investment decisions 
3.2.1 Reputation of receivers 
In the reputation treatment, senders observe the reputation, i.e. the average 
proportion returned in previous period, of their receiver before proceeding to their  
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investment decisions. We observe that the average proportion of endowment 
invested in the reputation treatment is not significantly different than in the 
baseline treatment. Preliminary regression analysis (see column (2) of table 2) 
however suggests that additional information provided in the reputation treatment 
has a significant impact on individual decision. 
Table	4:	Random-effects	ordered	probit	regressions	for	trust	-	Treatment-specific	samples	
 Amount sent by sender Si 
 (1) Baseline 
(2) 
Reputation 
(3) 
Transparency 
Lag Amount Sent 1.279*** 
(0.234) 
0.239 
(0.363) 
0.870** 
(0.395) 
Lag Amount Received 0.651*** 
(0.083) 
0.399* 
(0.205) 
0.736*** 
(0.170) 
Die Outcome (Rule) 0.101* 
(0.056) 
0.167*** 
(0.046) 
0.163** 
(0.066) 
Reputation of the receiver - 1.196** (0.542) - 
Receiver with no reputation a  -0.663 (0.538)  
Received less than other sender - - 0.298** (0.138) 
Received more than other sender - - 0.090 (0.142) 
Period Number -0.032*** 
(0.009) 
-0.012 
(0.012) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
Female -0.163 
(0.256) 
-0.477 
(0.350) 
-0.290 
(0.240) 
Age 0.013 
(0.036) 
0.055 
(0.057) 
0.021 
(0.034) 
British -0.196 
(0.315) 
-0.180 
(0.311) 
0.193 
(0.434) 
# Observations 454 456 456 
# Groups 24 24 24 
Log pseudo-likelihood -667.1874 -663.9358 -720.8006 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on the independent observation level (cohorts of six 
individuals)* 90% significance ** 95% significance *** 99% significance 
 a Receivers that did not receive any endowment in previous period could not make any choice and 
therefore did not build any reputation. As such, senders were only informed that the receiver could 
not make any choice. 
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Column (2) of table 4 reports estimates of the determinants of trust in the 
reputation treatment. Unlike for the baseline and the transparency treatment, 
amount sent in the previous period does not play a significant role, suggesting low 
persistence over time. Both the amount received back in the previous period and 
the outcome of the die affect positively and significantly the investment decision 
of senders. We take into account the situations for which no reputation was 
displayed, i.e. the receiver did not receive any amount from senders in previous 
period. Displaying no reputation does not appear to have any significant impact 
on trust in the reputation treatment. 
The reputation of the receiver appears to be a critical determinant of trust. The 
probability to observe no trust (X=0) decreases significantly with the reputation of 
the receiver. Table 5 reports for each potential reputation the frequencies and the 
predicted probabilities to observe respectively no trust and a total trust. Our model 
predicts that the probability for a sender to send nothing is reduced by more than 
half when the receiver has a reputation of 50% rather than 0%. In the same way, 
the probability for the sender to invest her whole endowment increase 
dramatically with the reputation, from 3.56% (Reputation of 0) to 23.57% 
(Reputation of 1). 
One could argue that the impact of reputation could reflect the interaction 
dynamics within the cohort and not the effect of the display of reputation to 
senders at the beginning of the period. We compare the impact of the reputation 
displayed to the senders in the reputation senders, and the reputation not displayed 
to senders in the baseline and transparency treatment. We observe that trust is 
positively correlated to the reputation of the receiver in the reputation treatment 
(rho=0.2453, p=0.0000), whereas it does not affect trust in the baseline treatment 
(rho=0.0683, p=0.1568) or the transparency treatment (rho=0.0527, p=0.2692). 
Even more striking, the average profit of a receiver is positively correlated to her 
average reputation over the 20 periods (rho=0.2863, p=0.0000). In the opposite, in 
the baseline and the transparency treatment, the average proportion returned in 
previous period affects negatively profits (rho=-0.7712, p=0.0000 for baseline; 
rho=-0.6245, p=0.0000 for transparency). Because reputation is not displayed to 
senders in these treatments, returning more does not pay off. 
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Table 5: Distribution of receivers’ reputation and predicted trust 
Reputation Frequency Predicted probability for no 
trust (X=0) 
Predicted probability for full 
trust (X=1) 
0% 33 0.3178*** 0.0356* 
10% 30 0.2798*** 0.0450** 
20% 36 0.2440*** 0.0562** 
30% 27 0.2109*** 0.0696*** 
40% 28 0.1805*** 0.0852*** 
50% 28 0.1530*** 0.1034*** 
60% 9 0.1284*** 0.1243*** 
70% 3 0.1067** 0.1479*** 
80% 2 0.0877* 0.1744*** 
90% 2 0.0713 0.2037*** 
100% 0 0.0574 0.2357*** 
* 90% significance ** 95% significance *** 99% significance 
Note: The reputation of the receiver is displayed to two senders, but reported only once in this 
table. Predicted probabilities are computed for average values of every variable except reputation 
of the receiver and no reputation 
 
Result 5: In the reputation treatment, sender’s investment decision is directly 
related to receiver’s reputation. Although building reputation could be an 
efficient way to increase profit, only few receivers do so. As such, trust and profits 
in the reputation treatment are not different than in the baseline treatment. 
 
3.2.2 Social comparison 
In the transparency treatment, the sender observes both the proportion returned to 
her and the proportion returned to the other sender by the receiver at the end of 
each round. We have observed so far that the level of trust in the transparency 
treatment is higher than in the baseline and the reputation treatments (see result 1 
and 2). Furthermore, estimates reported in column (2) of table 2 suggest that this 
difference is mainly lead by senders that received less than the fellow sender. 
In average in the transparency treatment, the investment decision of a sender that 
received back a lower proportion that the other send increases by about 6 
percentage points. In the opposite, senders who observed to be above in terms of 
received proportion decrease in average their investment by about 5 percentage 
points. One should however be careful when interpreting these figures, as three 
main effects may be at stake.  First, provided that sender’s investment decision 
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and receiver’s returning decision are strongly correlated, these variations could 
merely reflect a “regression to the mean” phenomenon6. Second, we have 
observed that trust is positively related to the proportion received in previous 
period. As such, one could expect senders that receive more to increase their 
investment in further decisions. Third, senders have the opportunity to compare 
proportions received in the transparency treatment. A sender that received less 
than the other sender could see in this position an encouragement to invest more. 
Column (3) of table 4 reports estimates of the determinants of trust in the 
transparency treatment and allows isolating the effect of the displayed information 
on both proportions returned by the receiver in previous period. As for all other 
treatments, the proportion received in the previous interaction positively affects 
sender’s trust. Controlling for this effect and for the previous investment decision, 
we observe that those who receive less than the other sender in the previous round 
invest more than senders who receive an equal or larger proportion. This effect 
might explain the higher trust level in the transparency treatment compared to the 
baseline and the reputation treatments. Inequality between senders in the returning 
decision of receivers could then be an efficient way to increase the total trust in 
the network7. 
The average absolute differential between proportions returned to both senders by 
a sender in the transparency treatment is about 22.5 percentage points. This figure 
is not significantly different than the average absolute differential observed in the 
reputation treatment (21.75 percentage points, p=0.8169). It is however 
significantly lower than in the baseline treatment (29 percentage points, 
p=0.0487). It appears then that receivers in the transparency treatment do benefit 
from the fact that return inequalities increase trust and profits, without increasing 
the level of relative inequality in the network. 
Result 6: In the transparency treatment, providing information on both returning 
decisions from the receiver affects positively the trust of senders that are 
disadvantaged. As a result, trust is larger in the transparency treatment than in 
the baseline and reputation treatments. 
																																																								
6 Considering the investment decision as partly stochastic, one could expect participants who send 
more (resp. less) than the mean to decrease (resp. increase) their investment decision in the 
subsequent period. 
7 Although we have implemented a stranger matching mechanism, i.e. participants are re-matched 
every round in networks, the relatively small size of our cohorts enhances the effect of information 
on trust dynamics.  
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3.3. Compliance to the rule 
3.3.1 Compliance from the senders 
Previous regression analysis has shown that the outcome of the die, corresponding 
to a suggested proportion to send, has a systematic impact on investment 
decisions. This effect is positive and significant, suggesting that the higher the 
exogenous recommendation, the higher the amount invested by the sender. In 
table 6, it is reported the descriptive statistics for the compliance by the senders. 
Overall, we do not find evidence for treatment difference in compliance to the 
rule. The proportion of investment decision for which the sender has followed the 
rule is 30.00% in the baseline treatment, 33.13% in the reputation treatment and 
30.00% in the transparency treatment8.  We do not observe any significant 
treatment difference when we evaluate the average proportion of times that 
senders send more and less than less, also reported in table 6. Table	6:	Compliance	to	the	rule-	Descriptive	statistics	for	the	senders	
Proportion of senders FOLLOWING the rule 
Total Baseline Reputation Transparency 
31.05% 30.00% 33.12% 30.00% 
(0.4628) (0.4573) (0.4711) (0.4587) 
Proportion of senders SENDING MORE than the rule 
Total Baseline Reputation Transparency 
24.09% 24.30% 21.25% 26.60% 
(0.42780 (0.4297) (0.4095) (0.4426) 
Proportion of senders SENDING LESS than the rule 
Total Baseline Reputation Transparency 
44.86% 45.62% 45.62% 43.33% 
(0.4975) (0.4986) (0.4986) (0.496) 
Notes: Standard deviations are displayed in parentheses; Stars report significance level from 
Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney tests run on independent observations (cohorts of 6 participants) to 
confirm differences with the baseline treatment. 
*90% significance ** 95% significance *** 99% significance 
 
Figure 4 reports the distribution of investment decisions for each outcome of the 
die. We observe that participants tend to follow the rule as long as the rule is not 
too high. The proportion suggested by the die is the modal outcome when this 
suggestion lies between 0% and 60%. However, when the outcome of the die 
suggests sending 80% or 100% of sender’s endowment, the modal investment 
decision is to send 0%. This observation echoes previous experimental findings 																																																								
8 We also do not find significant difference between treatments when conditioning the decision to 
follow the rule on the outcome of the die. 
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(e.g. Dale and Morgan, 2010) that show in the context of public good games that 
non-binding recommendations could affect individual decisions, provided that 
they are seen as “reasonable”. 
 
Figure 4 – Frequencies of investment decisions regarding exogenous rule 
 
 
Column (1) of table 7 reports estimates of the determinants of compliance 
decision from the senders. Consistent with previous observation the higher the 
proportion suggested by the rule, the lower the probability that sender complies 
with it. Regression results also suggest that compliance slightly decreases over 
time. We observe a negative and significant correlation between period and 
compliance with the rule (Spearman’s rho=-0.1017, p=0.0538). Here again, we do 
not find evidence of difference in compliance among treatments. 
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Table	7	Random-effect	probit	regression	for	compliance	(following	the	suggested	rule)	
 Individual decision corresponds to the rule suggested by the die 
 (1) Senders 
(2) 
Receivers 
Baseline Treatment Ref. Ref. 
Reputation Treatment 0.066 
(0.102) 
-0.004 
(0.208) 
Transparency Treatment -0.017 
(0.133) 
0.062 
(0.199) 
Outcome of the die -0.801*** 
(0.159) 
-1.384*** 
(0.103) 
Proportion Received - 0.006 
(0.241) 
Period -0.015** 
(0.007) 
-0.012 
(0.009) 
Female 0.091 
(0.124) 
0.265 
(0.200) 
Age -0.053** 
(0.025) 
-0.030 
(0.022) 
British -0.064 
(0.121) 
-0.068 
(0.306) 
Constant 1.066* 
(0.561) 
0.791 
(0.555) 
# Observations 1440 1096 
# Individuals 72 36 
Log pseudo-likelihood 
-841.3950 -616.5934 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on the independent observation 
level (cohorts of six individuals) 
* 90% significance ** 95% significance *** 99% significance 
 
3.3.2 Compliance from the receivers 
Such as sender’s investment decision, previous regression analysis has shown that 
receiver’s returning decision is positively and significantly affected by the 
outcome of the die (see table 3). Table 8 displays the descriptive statistics for the 
compliance of the receivers. The proportion of returning decision for which the 
rule have been followed by the receiver is 29.58% in the baseline treatment, 
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29.37% in the reputation treatment and 32.29% in the transparency treatment. No 
significant difference between treatments is observed in the decision to comply 
with the suggested rule. 
Table	8	Compliance	to	the	rule-	Descriptive	statistics	for	the	receivers	
Proportion of senders FOLLOWING the rule 
Total Baseline Reputation Transparency 
30.41% 29.58% 29.37% 32.29% 
(0.4602) (0.4568) (0.4559) (0.468) 
Proportion of senders SENDING MORE than the rule 
Total Baseline Reputation Transparency 
13.95% 17.50% 13.13% 11.04% 
(0.3466) (0.3803) (0.3402) (0.3137) 
Proportion of senders SENDING LESS than the rule 
Total Baseline Reputation Transparency 
55.62% 52.91% 57.29% 56.66% 
(0.4969) (0.4996) (0.4951) (0.496) 
Notes : Standard deviations are displayed in parentheses ; Stars report significance level 
from Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney tests run on independent observations (cohorts of 6 
participants) to confirm differences with the baseline treatment. 
*90% significance ** 95% significance *** 99% significance 
 
We also report in table 8, the percentage of cases in which receivers returned less 
than the rule and more than the rule. We do not find any significant difference 
between the treatments and the baseline.  
Figure 5 reports for each outcome of the die the distribution of receivers’ 
returning decisions. Whereas suggestions of relatively small return are often 
followed, only few receivers comply with rule suggesting a return above 50%. It 
should however be noted that the rule significantly improves returning decision, 
even if it suggests a high return. When the outcome of the die suggests to return 
the whole amount received, receivers do so in about 14.87% of cases. Considering 
other rules, receivers decide to return the whole amount received in only 2.55% of 
cases. Column (2) of table 7 reports estimates of the determinants of compliance 
decision from the receivers. It appears that only the outcome of the die has a 
significant and negative impact on the probability to follow the rule. 
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Figure	5	–	Frequencies	of	returning	decisions	regarding	exogenous	rule	
 
 
Result 7: For both senders and receivers and across all treatments, the non-
binding rule suggested by the die has a significant and positive impact on 
individual decisions. Compliance to the rule tends to decrease as the amount 
suggested by the rule increases. 
 
4. Conclusion 	
We implement a controlled laboratory experiment to investigate trust and 
trustworthiness in a networked investment game in which two senders interact 
with a receiver. Previous studies using a comparable framework (Buskens et al., 
2010; Cassar and Rigdon, 2011) have shown that providing full information 
regarding actions and outcomes across the network could increase both trust and 
trustworthiness. We compare a baseline treatment in which senders are only 
informed about the actions and outcomes of their own investment games to two 
information treatments.  
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In the reputation treatment, senders receive ex ante information regarding the 
average amount returned by the receiver in the previous period. In average, 
neither the level of trust nor the level of trustworthiness is affected by the 
introduction of additional information in this treatment. Receiver’s reputation 
however significantly affects sender’s investment decision at the individual level. 
Introducing reputation allows trustworthy receivers to benefit from higher 
investment. In the opposite, it disadvantages receivers with low reputation. 
Although receivers face strong incentives to build reputation, we do not observe 
any increase in trustworthiness compared to the baseline treatment. For that 
reason, despite a significant effect of reputation at the individual level, the level of 
trust does not increases at the aggregate level. 
In the transparency treatment, each sender receives ex post additional information 
regarding the returning decision of the receiver to the other sender in the network. 
Sender’s investment decision significantly increases in the transparency treatment, 
despite the fact that receivers returning decision does not vary in average. As a 
result, receiver’s profit is in average higher in the transparency treatment than in 
the baseline and reputation treatments. Receivers, in the transparency treatment, 
benefit from social comparison between senders. A sender who has been 
disadvantaged tends to trust more in the following round, whereas no change in 
trust is observed for those who received an equal or larger proportion than their 
counterpart. In contrast to Cassar and Rigdon (2011), we do not observe evidence 
of comparative trust, i.e. returning decisions depending on the investment decision 
in the other link in the network. In their experimental setting, senders face full 
disclosure regarding the amount sent and the amount returned along the other ling 
of the network. Receiver’s returning decision could therefore be used as a hint to 
promote trust. Senders in our experimental design only face partial information, 
and do not observe the other sender’s actions. The incentive for receivers to 
reward trustful senders might then appear less attractive than in a full information 
setting. Although inequalities in return could be used as a lever to increase trust 
within the network, we observe than these inequalities are significantly lower than 
in the baseline treatment. 
Another novelty in our experimental design lies in the provision of an exogenous, 
non-binding and private recommendation to participants before they reach their 
sending or returning decision. For both senders and receivers, this non-binding 
rule has a significant and positive impact on individual decisions. This finding is 
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observed across all treatments, suggesting that additional information does not 
substitute for the rule as a determinant of individual decision. The fact that 
participants voluntarily comply with the rule echoes previous experimental results 
on aversion to dishonesty (e.g. Gneezy, 2005; Sanchez-Pages and Vorsatz, 2007; 
Hurkens and Kartik, 2009; Lundquist et al., 2009; Fischbacher and Heusi, 2013). 
Data also suggest that compliance to the rule significantly decreases as the 
amount suggested by this rule increases. This finding is consistent with Dale and 
Morgan (2010) that have shown in the context of a public good game that non-
binding recommendations could affect individual decisions, as long as they are 
seen as reasonable. 
Overall, our experimental study offers precious insight on the role of information 
in network embedded trust games. So far, trust has been mainly addressed in the 
context of bilateral interactions in the experimental literature. There are however 
many examples of economic interactions for which trusting decision could be 
affected by network effects. For instance, empirical studies have shown that trust 
in the governing institutions is a significant determinant of (voluntary) tax 
compliance (e.g. Scholtz and Lubell, 1998; Torgler, 2003). In this context, it 
appears particularly relevant to consider how the diffusion of information 
regarding governments’ actions across social networks could impact individuals’ 
trust. Our findings suggest for instance that reputation building, as well as 
allowing for social comparison could be efficient ways to improve trust within 
networks. 
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1. Introduction  
 
1.1. Motivation 
 
Trust and trustworthiness play an important role in economic interactions. 
Trusting behaviors have been extensively studied in the economic literature, and 
particularly in the experimental one, since Berg et al. introduced the first trust 
game in 1995. In Berg et al. (1995), two players (one sender and one receiver) 
interact in a complete information framework. However, bilateral exchanges are 
often embedded in networks: an agent (receiver) may represent the interests of 
multiple principals (senders). There are potential gains from trust: if an agent 
displays trustworthiness, then both parties are better off than in the situation in 
which no trade takes place. When people interact repeatedly, social information of 
current and past interactions are essential when individuals make their decisions 
in a larger network, even though the social information available is often limited 
and so, not complete.  
People do not always exchange with others who belong to the same social status 
in the group. Therefore, interactions between agents with different social status 
within networks are common in real life situations. According to Ball et al. 
(2001), a person’s status is a ranking in a hierarchy that is socially recognized and 
typically carries with it the expectation of entitlement to certain resources. 
Individuals can be ranked in different ways, for example based on specific skills 
and accomplishments. In a particular social context, an individual’s status entitles 
to certain privileges and may affect how she interacts with others. In our 
experiment, and following Eckel et al. (2010) 9,  high status is awarded to the best 
performers on a task in a preliminary stage, and therefore granted by merit or 
deservedness, while low status is given to bottom performers. One straight 
application of this setting could be in the labor market and in the relationship of 
trust between employees with different ranks or positions within organizations 
(e.g. employees exchanging with a team leader, or stakeholders interacting with a 
																																																								
9 Eckel et al (2010) use performance on trivia quiz as proxy of status in order to assigned roles in a 
network. Best performers become central players and bottom performers became peripheral 
players. 
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CEO).  Recent research findings suggest that companies might benefit by raising 
the level of trust in organizations (e.g. Austin, 2013; Brown et al, 2015). Lower 
bureaucracy, simpler procedures and higher level of productivity characterize 
high-trust settings. 
In this study, and following Borzino et al. (2015), we implement a networked 
version of the standard trust game with two senders and one receiver. In Borzino 
et al (2015), the roles are assigned arbitrarily at the beginning of the game. 
However, in this study, we manipulate social status by introducing a selection 
mechanism in a preliminary stage of the game, as in Eckel et al (2010). Therefore, 
we use merit (deservedness) as proxy of high status legitimacy. This means that 
best performers in a preliminary unrelated task get the role of high status receivers 
while bottom performers become low status senders. We evaluate whether the 
introduction of social status has an effect in the level of trust and trustworthiness.  
We manipulate in a minimal way the social information available to low status 
senders about the high status receiver’s behavior compared with a control 
treatment (baseline merit) in which no social information is given to senders. In 
the Transparency merit treatment, senders receive information about the 
proportion returned by the receiver at the end of each round. In the Reputation 
merit treatment, both senders receive information about the average proportion 
returned by the receiver in the previous round. We assess how these policies alter 
performance when differences in social status are involved among the network 
members.  
Another feature in our study is the introduction of a private and non-binding 
suggestion about the amount to send and return. This suggestion is fair because, if 
both sender and receiver follow the suggestion, they guarantee to each other equal 
expected payoffs. This suggestion mimics a social norm related to fairness and 
equality. Therefore, we want to evaluate whether the high status receivers and low 
status senders follow the suggestion making voluntary compliance of the social 
norm explicit.  
Our results suggest that, both ex ante and ex post information given to low status 
senders about the high status receiver’s performance, have a significant effect in 
investment decisions. Trust is substantially higher in the transparency merit 
compared with the baseline merit in the whole experiment. In the transparency 
merit treatment, high status receivers take advantage of the social comparison 
than he triggers by returning unequal proportions to the low status senders in the 
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group. Low status senders tend to increase their investment in the following round 
when receiving less than other senders in their group. Besides, we find support for 
the “competition for cooperation hypothesis” formulated by Cassar and Rigdon 
(2011): low status senders receiving more, tend to send even more in the 
following round in order to keep the “grace” of the high status receiver.  
In the reputation merit condition, the aggregate level of trust is not higher than in 
the baseline merit treatment. However, investment decisions are directly and 
positively related with the reputation of the high status receiver. This finding 
suggests that receiving information about the reputation of the high status 
receiver, increase the level of trust at individual level.  
Interestingly, trustworthiness is not significantly different across the three 
treatments. Our results suggest that trustworthy behavior does not change over 
time implying a lack of reciprocity from the high status receivers towards the low 
status senders. Low status senders tend to penalize high status receivers’ 
misbehavior by increasing the frequency of no trust in which nothing is sent. In 
the baseline merit condition, nothing is sent in the 49,38% of the cases, while in 
the reputation merit and in the transparency merit treatments goes down to 
29.17% and 26.61% respectively. Therefore, the presence of social information 
seems to be critical in a significant increase of trust. 
The exogenous non-binding suggestion has a positive and significant impact on 
the level of trust but high status receivers’ decisions are still not affected by the 
non-binding recommendation. 
The rest of study is organized as follows: section 1.2. provides the literature 
background. Section 2 expands on the experimental design and procedures. The 
results are described in section 3, while section 4 concludes. We also compare the 
results obtained in Borzino et al. (2005) with the ones from the current study. 
Appendix 1 of this chapter shows the results from the comparison.  
 
2.2 .Background 	
Recent experimental studies focus on interaction in three–node networked trust 
games in which two senders interact with one receiver. Their findings suggest that 
the level of trust and trustworthiness are affected when the senders receive full 
information about the outcomes of the interactions in the group (Buskens et al., 
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2010; Cassar and Rigdon, 2011). In both studies, full information (Full-Info 
treatment) significantly increase the level of trust and trustworthiness compared 
with a No-Info treatment in which subjects get information about individual 
outcomes only at the end of each round. 
It is not easy to find real life examples where the information is complete. In this 
study, and following closely Borzino et al (2015), we manipulate in a minimal 
way the information senders receive about the receiver’s performance. Borzino et 
al (2015) analyze a three-node networked trust game in which two senders 
interact with one receiver. The assignment of the fixed roles (sender or receiver) 
is random. Their results show that social information has a significant impact on 
trust but not a significant effect on trustworthiness.  
The difference between the current study and Borzino et al (2015) is the 
endogenous manipulation of the social status of the players. We are interested in 
the relationship of trust between senders and receiver who belong to different 
status. In our study, high status is awarded by merit and then used as a proxy for 
legitimacy. Recently, lab experiments have been conducted in order to analyze the 
interactions between high status individuals with low status ones. On the one 
hand, Bosco and Marcheselli (2005) found that performance-based allocation of 
statuses results in a discrimination expressed by higher status participants and; 
Nikiforakis et al. (2014) found that higher status subject do not hesitate to exploit 
those of lower status. On the other hand, Morozova (2015) found that the high 
status players behave fairly and altruistically towards their low status group 
members, as their actions can be resulting from either being oblivious to groups as 
such, or driven by a ‘noblesse oblige’ effect. The author conducted an extension 
of that by Chen and Li (2009), incorporating status in the group identities in a 
dictator and trust games. The status is given to the players according to their 
performance in a trial phase and so, awarded by deservedness as a proxy for status 
legitimacy, as in Ball et al. (2001).  
 
Legitimacy plays an important role in the interaction between high and low status 
members. Turner and Brown (1978) show that the lack of status legitimacy in 
higher status groups results in hostility towards lower status individuals, while the 
lack of it biases lower status groups against higher status ones. Nadler (2002) 
suggests that in the latter case the low status groups would be reluctant to accept 
help from higher status individuals, yet the reverse effect is not be present. Liebe 
 47 
and Tunic (2010) test the “noblesse oblige” hypothesis in a dictator game, in 
which high status individuals donate more, and the higher the status of the 
recipient, the less she receives in donations. Furthermore, high-status individuals 
show a greater in-group bias if they perceive the status hierarchy as more 
legitimate, while low-status individuals favour high status members. 
An important feature of our experiment is the introduction of a non-binding 
recommendation about the amount to send and return. This social norm fair in 
terms of expected pay-offs. Recent studies have focused on the role of non-
binding suggested donations in the context of public good games. Karlan and List 
(2007)’s field experiment shows that suggestions do not increase the level of 
donations. In a lab experiment, Dale and Morgan (2010) find socially optimal 
suggestions to be ineffective. However, when the suggestion is more moderate, it 
has a significant effect compared with the control treatment. Warwick (2005) 
suggests that reasonable suggested donations produce an effective increase in 
giving compared with situation in which the suggestions are socially optimums. 
Weyant and Smith (2006) find similar results in their field experiment. Marks, 
Schanberg and Croson (1999) find in a lab experiment that suggested donations 
have a positive effect when the contributors obtain different payoffs from giving. 
From these results, one might hypothesize that non-binding suggestions may have 
a positive effect on trust and trustworthiness in a trust game.  In this line, Borzino 
et al (2015) introduce a private suggestion about the level of investments and 
returns in a networked trust game, and find that the suggestions have a significant 
and positive impact on the players’ decisions, when the suggestion is 
“reasonable”.  
Our study contributes to the literature by exploring the effect of manipulation of 
the social status in a three-node networked investment game by assigning the 
roles according to the performance of the players in a trial phase. Therefore, we 
manipulate the social status of the players using merit (or deservedness) as proxy 
for high status legitimacy. We also manipulate the social information available to 
the low status senders: they receive info about the performance of the high status 
receiver in the current (Transparency merit treatment) or previous round 
(Reputation merit treatment) related to a benchmark in which no information is 
provided. We want to study how social information interacts with differences in 
status in a networked trust game. Besides, we want to evaluate whether status 
differences have an effect in the compliance of the social norm. 
 48 
 
2. Experimental design and procedures 
 
2.1. The three players investment game 
Berg et al. (1995) introduced the first trust game (or investment game), which 
consists in two players (one sender and one receiver) interacting sequentially. 
First, the sender decide how much to send to the receiver and that amount in 
multiply by a factor k where k>1. In a second stage, the receiver decided how 
much to send back to the sender. 
In this work, we implement a three-node investment game with two senders and 
one receiver following the experimental design in Borzino et al. (2015), as 
presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          									Figure 1: three-node investment game with two senders (S1 and S2) and one 
receiver (R) 
 
 
In Borzino et al. (2015) a random assignment of roles (sender or receiver) was 
implemented at the beginning of the experiment. In this study, we implement a 
selection mechanism in which the roles are assigned according to players’ 
performance of the players in a preliminary task. The task consists in adding two 
digits number for three minutes. The best performers become high status receivers 
and the worse performers become low status senders, following the mechanism 
used in Eckel et al (2010) 10. The players are randomly assigned to a cohort of 6 
players formed by four low status senders and two high status receivers. The roles 
are fixed for the entire duration of the game (20 periods). Each cohort represents 
our independent observation given that re-matching process is applied only within 																																																								
10 Eckel et al (2010) use a trivia quiz of 15 questions. In this study instead, the task consists in 
adding to digits numbers for three minutes. The average score was 23.59 correct answers (with a 
minimum of 2 and a maximum of 49). 
R			
S1   S2   
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each cohort at the end of each round. Each round consists on 5 stages display in 
table 1, which illustrates the sequence of the game.  
 
Table 1: sequence of each experimental round 
1st stage:  
Low status 
Senders 
2nd stage:  
Low status 
Senders 
3rd stage:  
Low status 
Senders 
4th stage:  
High status 
Receiver 
5th stage:  
High status  
Receiver Real-Effort	Task Signal	1:	die Trust	(X) Signal	2:	die Trustworthiness	(Y) 
 
1st stage – real effort task: In this stage, low status senders perform a real-effort 
task for one minute. The task consists in adding two digits numbers (the same task 
that they perform in the trial phase) for one minute. This task gives senders the 
opportunity to earn their endowment11. Each correct answer is multiplied by a 
factor of 2 ECU. The number of correct answers cannot exceeds 5 meaning that 
the can get a maximum of 10 ECU as endowment. High status receivers do not 
participate in this task but receive a fixed endowment of 5 ECU at the end of each 
round.  
2nd stage- Signal for sending decision: Each low status sender get a non-binding 
signal (see section 2.2) about the proportion to send by throwing a virtual die of 
six faces. 
3rd stage- Sending decision: Each low status sender decides the proportion of her 
endowment to send to the high status receiver. It can be any proportion among the 
following: 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% or 100%. The amount sent is multiplied by 
four and received by the high status receiver. 
4th stage- Signal for returning decision: Before deciding the proportion to return 
back to each of the two low status senders matched with her, the high status 
receiver gets two non-binding signals about the proportion to return to each low 
status sender. She throws a virtual die twice, one for each sender. 
5th stage- Returning decision: The high status receiver decides the proportion to 
return back to each low status sender (S1 and S2) matched with him in the group 
in that particular round. 
 
At the end of the each period, participants are informed about their individual 
outcome. The high status receiver gets information about the two interactions with 
the two low status senders while senders received only personal information about 
the game they have just played. 																																																								
11 See Houser and Xiao (2014) for a discussion of “house of money effects” in trust games. 
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The game described above corresponds to the baseline merit treatment. In the two 
other treatments, additional information about the performance of the high status 
receiver is given to the low status senders at the end (ex post) or at the beginning 
(ex ante) of each round accordingly. Further description of the treatments will be 
given in section 2.3. 
 
2.2. The Signal 
 
In our experimental framework, we introduced a non-binding recommendation 
that low status senders and high status receivers get before deciding the 
proportion to send or return respectively. The level of recommendation is 
represented by the outcome of the die (see table 2). The value of the signal is 
defined as: 𝑆 = 0.2 ⋅ (𝐷 − 1) 
The signal follows a discrete uniform distribution S ~ DU(6, 0, 0.2), which is 
known by the subjects since the beginning of the experiment. 
 
Table 2: Recommendation associated to each outcome of the die Outcome	of	the	die: 1 2 3 4 5 6 
%	to	keep 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% %	to	send	to	the	receiver		 						or	%	to	send	back	to	the	sender 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
 
A sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is the only equilibrium of this game if all 
the players are totally rational and profit-maximizers. This equilibrium can be 
solved by backward induction: the sender sends nothing given that she anticipates 
that the receiver maximizes his profit by not returning anything back. Therefore, 
this equilibrium is characterized by absence of interaction and their final payoffs 
are equal to their initial endowments. Under this scenario, the introduction of the 
non-binding signal does not change the theoretical prediction. 
 
Now, let us consider the case in which both type of players, low status sender and 
high status receiver, totally comply with their respective signals. The 
recommendation S may take value 𝑆! ∈ 0 ;  0.2 ;  0.4 ; 0.6 ; 0.8 ; 1  with a fixed 
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probability of  𝑝! = !!. The expected value of the exogenous signal is then 50 % as 
observed below: 
𝐸 𝑆 = 𝑝! ⋅ 𝑆! = 16!!!! ⋅ 𝑆! = 0.5
!
!!!  
 
If we assumed that the decisions of both low status sender (X) and high status 
receiver (Y) fully follow the outcome of the die, and then E[X]=E[Y]=0.5. The 
expected payoff of the full compliant low status sender  (𝜋!! ) and the full 
compliant high merit receiver (𝜋!! ) expressions are: 
 𝐸 𝜋!! = 𝐸 𝑒 − 𝑋𝑒 + 4𝑋𝑒 ⋅ 𝑌 = 1.5𝑒 
           𝐸 𝜋!! = 𝐸 4𝑋𝑒 ⋅ 1− 𝑌 + 5 = 𝑒 + 5	
where e is low status sender’s endowment earned at the beginning of each round 
in the real-effort task. The implementation of the real effort task is aimed to avoid 
“windfall money effect” in the context of trust games described by Houser and 
Xiao (2015). The authors sustain that decisions using “own money” significantly 
and substantively differ from those using found money. We set an upper limit to 
the amount of endowment that low status senders can get in each round (10 ECU) 
in order to limit heterogeneity in low status senders’ endowment. In fact, low 
status senders reached in a 93.55% of the observations the maximum endowment 
of 10 ECU12. In the presence of the maximum endowment, the expected profit of 
a compliant sender and a compliant high status receiver are equal: 
 𝜋!! 𝑒 = 10 = 𝐸 𝜋!! 𝑒 = 10 = 15 
 
The rule may be considered fair as both the low status sender and the high status 
receiver follow the rule guarantee equal expected payoffs by following the rule. 
Besides, the resulting outcomes would be significantly higher for both senders 
and receiver than the ones implied by the perfect sub-game Nash equilibrium, 
even when the social welfare is maximized when trust is complete, and senders 
invest 100% of their earned endowment. 
 
 																																																								
12 We find that 71 senders (over a total of 76) get the maximum endowment 10 ECU in each of the 
20 rounds. 
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2.3. Information  
 
In this experiment, we manipulate the information available to low status senders 
about the performance of the high status receiver. In the baseline merit treatment, 
the only information the participants get is individual (their personal interaction 
with the high status receiver).  
In the reputation merit treatment, we give information to the low status senders 
about the performance of the high status receiver in the previous round. This ex 
ante information is a proxy to the reputation of the high status receiver, measured 
as the average proportion that that high status receiver sent to low status senders 
in the previous round13. We consider this to be minimal information about the 
performance of high status receivers.  
In the transparency merit treatment, low status senders receive information about 
the performance of high status receiver in that round. This ex post information 
provides the proportion received back from the high status receiver and, besides, 
the proportion received back by the other low status sender in the same network. 
We consider this to be minimal information about the performance of high status 
receiver.  
 
2.4. Procedures 
 
All the experimental sessions were conducted at ESSEXLab in the University of 
Essex. We electronically recruited 114 participants, mainly business and 
economics undergraduate students, all inexperienced in trust games. We collected 
data from six independent observations of six participants for the baseline merit 
and the reputation merit and seven for the transparency merit. On average, a 
session lasted 100 minutes, including initial instructions, quiz, trial phase, final 
questionnaire and payment of the subjects. The average payment was around 
£12.50, including a show up fee of £5. The instructions were read aloud. The only 
difference in the instructions was the information available, according to each 
treatment. The experiment was computerized using Z-TREE (Fischbacher, 2007). 																																																								
13 As an example, suppose that that receiver returned to one sender 20% and to the other sender 
40% in t-1. This means that, at the beginning of the following round, the senders will observe that 
the receiver’s reputation will be 30%. Note, that there is a re-matching inside each cohort of 6 
players each round. 
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2. Results  
3.1. Trust and trustworthiness across treatment 
 
3.1.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 3 reports average trust and average trustworthiness for the whole 
experiment, and for each treatment. We define “trust” as the proportion of 
endowment sent by senders to the receivers and, “trustworthiness” as the 
proportion of the amount received that the receiver decided to send back to the 
sender. In this experiment, roles are assigned according to the performance of the 
players in a preliminary stage of the game. The best performers have the role of 
high status receivers and the bottom performers the role of low status sender.  
In table 3, Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney tests are used to test any significant 
differences between treatments. The first part of table 3 shows the results for 
senders (for the three treatments and for each treatment). The first column 
illustrates the average proportion sent, including the cases in which no amount 
was sent. Trust is slightly higher in the transparency merit treatment relative to the 
baseline and for the reputation merit treatment, however differences are not 
statistically significant (p=0.1531 and p=0.3914, respectively). In the second 
column, we consider only the situations in which the trust is positive and, again 
we find no significant treatment differences.  
In the third column, we display the proportion of no trust at all. The proportion of 
interactions in which nothing was sent (no trust), is significantly lower in the 
transparency merit  (26.17%; p=0.0302) and in the reputation merit  (29.17%; 
p=0.0149) relative to the baseline merit condition (49,38%). Additionally, we 
observe large differences among treatments when we consider only the cases in 
which high status receivers face no choice i.e. both low status senders send 
nothing in the same round. This occurs in 65 out of 240 observations (27,08%) in 
the baseline merit; 19 out of 240 observations (7,91%) in the reputation merit and; 
22 out of 280 observations (7,85%) in the transparency merit treatment. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for trust and trustworthiness 
                             Trust  ̶  (Proportion X sent by senders) 
  
Amount sent Amount sent 
Proportion 
of X=0 
Average profit of 
sender 
(Including X=0) (X>0 only) (in £ / $) 
Total 
0.3684 0.5633 
34.61% 
£6.38 / $10 
(0.3564) (0.2904) (3.42)   (5.60) 
Baseline Merit 
 
0.2887 
 
0.5703 49.38% 
 
£7.10 / $11.62 
(0.3468) (0.0177 (3.33)    (5.46) 
Reputation Merit 
 
0.3758 
 
0.5305 29.17%** 
 
£6.30 / $10.32 
(0.3432) (0.0157) (3.31)     (5.43) 
Transparency Merit 
 
0.4303 
 
0.5863   26.61%** 
  
 £5.84 / $9.57 
(0.363) (0.0146) (3.48)    (5.71) 
Trustworthiness ̶  (Proportion Y returned by receivers) 
  
Amount returned Amount returned 
Proportion of 
Y=0 
Average profit 
of receiver (in £ 
/ $) (Including X=0) (X>0 only) (X>0 only) 
 
Total 
 
0.2077 
 
0.2399 
 
49.65% 
 
£5.24 / $8.59 
(0.2692) (0.2864) (0.27)    (0.44) 
 
Baseline Merit 
 
0.1675 
 
0.23 
 
57.92% 
 
£5.19 / $8.51 
(0.2899) (0.3424) (0.27)    (0.44) 
 
Reputation Merit 
 
0.207 
 
0.2123 
 
47.29% 
 
£5.26 / $8.61 
(0.2452) (0.2543) (0.26)    (0.42) 
Transparency Merit 0.2435 
(0.2666) 
0.269 
(0.2703) 
43.75% £5.28 / $8.64  
  (4.108)  (0.44)   
Notes: Standard deviations are displayed in parentheses; Stars report significance level from 
Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney tests run on independent observations (cohorts of 6 participants) to confirm 
differences with the baseline treatment.       
                               *90% significance ** 95% significance *** 99% significance 
 
The bottom part of table 3 reports trustworthiness, i.e. the decisions of the high 
status receivers. In the first column, we consider all the decisions including the 
cases in which no-trust is displayed by the low status senders (X=0). The 
proportion returned by the receivers is slightly higher in the transparency and in 
the reputation merit treatments compared with the baseline, but not significant 
(p=0.1495 and p=0.1331).  
 
When we consider only the interactions where the trust displayed was positive 
(X>0) in the second column, average trustworthiness is lower in the reputation 
merit but higher in the transparency merit related to the baseline merit. These 
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differences are again not statistically different (p=0.7761 and p=0.5348 
respectively). 
In the third column, we show the proportion of observations in which nothing is 
returned when the amount received was positive (X>0).  High status receivers 
tend to return more positive amounts in the reputation and in the transparency 
merit treatment but these differences are not statistically different from the 
baseline (p=0.3017 and p=0.4795, respectively). High status receivers return 
nothing to the low status sender (who sent a positive amount in first place) 139 
times out of 240 observations (57.92%) for the baseline merit; 227 times out of 
480 observations (47.29%) in the reputation merit treatment and; 140 times out of 
320 observations (43.75%) for the transparency treatment. 
 
Result 1: The proportion of No-Trust significantly decreases with social 
information (Reputation and Transparency), when receivers deserve their central 
position. 
 
Albeit low status senders give slightly more in the transparency and in the 
reputation conditions, they do not receive more in return compared with the 
baseline.  This is the reason why senders’ average payoff is lower in the 
transparency merit and in the reputation merit treatments in comparison with the 
baseline merit but the differences are insignificant in both cases.  
 
3.1.1 Trust 
 
Figure 2 shows the average proportion of the endowment sent by the low status 
senders by treatment and period. It suggests that trust is mainly lead by 
differences in dynamics across treatments. Trust does not vary over time in the 
baseline merit  (Spearman’s rho=-0.0619; p=0.1758) and in the transparency merit 
(Spearman’s rho=-0.0571; p=0.1770), but tends to decrease in the reputation merit 
treatment (Spearman’s rho=-0.0967; p=0.0341). 
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Figure 2: Average proportion of endowment sent (trust) by treatment over the 20 periods 
 
The levels of trust in the reputation merit and in the transparency merit treatments 
tend to be above the one observed in the baseline. 
Figure 3 shows the percentage of cases of no trust divided in blocks of 10 periods, 
i.e. the first 10 periods and the last 10 periods of the game. It seems that the 
number of decisions in which nothing is sent does not vary over time in the 
baseline merit  (Spearman’s rho=0.0661; p=0.1480), but increases in the 
reputation merit  (Spearman’s rho=0.0906; p=0.0472) and in the transparency 
merit  (Spearman’s rho=0.1244; p=0.0032).  Consistent with result 1, we observe 
that the proportion of nothing sent in the first and in the second block of 10 
periods are significantly lower in the transparency merit (p=0.0173 and p=0.0376, 
respectively) and in the reputation merit (p=0.0387 and p=0.0273, respectively) 
than in the baseline merit.  
0
.2
.4
.6
Av
er
ag
e 
pr
op
or
tio
n 
se
nt
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Period
Baseline merit Reputation merit
Transparency merit
 57 
	
Figure 3: Average proportion of nothing sent (no trust) by treatment in block of 10 
rounds 
 
Result 2: No-Trust does not vary over time in the baseline merit, however it 
increases in the reputation and transparency merit treatments.  
 
Table 4 reports the econometric regressions for the proportion sent14 by the low 
status senders. We control for past decisions for the outcome of the die, period 
and demographic variables.  
From column (1), trust is significantly higher in the transparency merit treatment 
than in the baseline. Trust increases over time and we also observe that the 
outcome of the die has a positive impact in the decision of the low status senders. 
Compliance to the exogenous rule will be discussed in section 3.3. 
In column (2), we add additional controls in order to have a better understanding 
of the determinants of the trust. We introduce an interactive variable for the 
reputation of the high status receiver (Reputation merit treatment x reputation of 
the high status receiver). This is a continue variable which capture the effect of 
the reputation of the high status receiver in the low status senders’ decisions. The 																																																								
14 Sender can send 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% or 100% of their endowment. Given the nature of 
the dependent variable, we decided to run a random effect ordered probit clustering by 
independent observation, rather than standard random effect regression. 
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coefficient is positive and significant suggesting that investment decisions are 
directly related to the reputation of the high status receiver. However, we do not 
observe that there is an aggregate effect in the level of trust in the reputation 
related to baseline (column 1) given that the coefficient of Reputation treatment is 
positive but insignificant. We will discuss extensively the role of the high status 
receivers’ reputation in section 3.2.1. 
 
Table 4: Random-effects ordered probit for the trust- pooled sample 
                                                                                           Proportion sent by Senders (Xit) 
  (1) (2) 
  
Pooled 1 
Merit 
Pooled 2 
Merit 
Outcome of the die (Rule) 0.172*** 0.177*** 
  (0.0251) (0.0278) 
Baseline Merit Treatment Ref Ref 
Reput. Merit Treatment 0.6070 0.4729 
 
(0.4310) (0.4509) 
Reput. Merit Treat x reputation of high status receiver - 0.6613*** 
   (0.217) 
Transp. Merit Treatment 0.7837* - 
  (0.0085)  
Transp. Merit Treatment x received as   
much as other low status sender - 0.4661 
  (0.4655) 
Transp. Treatment x received less - 0.3522*** 
   (0.0824) 
Transp. Treatment x received more  - 0.6146*** 
  
 
(0.145) 
Period 0.0179** -0.0197*** 
  (0.0085) (0.0084) 
Female -0.2866 -0.2464 
  (0.2423) (0.239) 
British -0.0574 -0.0506 
  (0.2568) (0.2593) 
Log pseudo likelihood -2159.5779 -2032.5032 
Observations 1,520 1,520 
Number of indiv 76 76 
 
We also introduced in column (2), three interactive variables for the transparency 
merit treatments: Transparency Merit Treatment x received as much as the other 
low status sender, Transparency Merit Treatment x received less, Transparency 
Merit Treatment x received more. We capture the role of social comparison 
between low status senders after knowing the amount received by the other sender 
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from the same high status receiver relative to the baseline case in which both 
senders receive back the same. Participants who received less than the other low 
status sender in the previous round tend to significantly increase the amount sent 
in t. Yet, low status senders who received more than the other sender also tend to 
significantly increase the level of trust in order to keep the “grace” of the high 
status receiver triggering a competition between senders in order to keep receiving 
the rewarding returns of the high status receiver. This last finding is consistent 
with the competition for cooperation hypothesis formulated by Cassar and Rigdon 
(2011). We will discuss more extensively the role of social comparison in section 
3.2.2. 
 
3.1.2. Trustworthiness 
 
The average proportion returned by the high status receivers in the different 
treatments over the 20 rounds is displayed in Figure 4. 
Consistent with Result 1, when we consider the 20 rounds, the level of 
trustworthiness is not significantly different in the reputation merit and in the 
transparency merit treatments in comparison with the baseline merit. From Figure 
4, it tends to decrease over time in the baseline merit (Spearman’s Rho=-0.0950; 
p=0.0375), in the reputation merit (Spearman’s Rho=-0.1355; p=0.0029) and, in 
the transparency merit treatment (Spearman’s Rho=-0.1448; p=0.006).  
Column (1) of table 5 reports estimates of the determinants of trustworthiness at 
individual level across treatments considering only the cases of positive trust. The 
variable Lagged total proportion sent corresponds to the sum of decisions of the 
low status senders in the previous round and, Lagged total proportion returned 
relates to the sum of the proportion returned by the receiver in t-1. As coefficients 
are not significant, we do not observe reciprocity from the high status receivers. 
The rule does not seem to have a significant effect in the decisions of the high 
status receivers either. 
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Figure 4: Average proportion returned (trustworthiness) by treatments over the 20 
periods 
 
 
Columns (2) to (4) display results of the within-treatments estimations. We do not 
observe any significant determinant of the trustworthiness, as in column (1). We 
do observe that high status female receivers tend to return less than males. This 
gender effect is significant when we consider all treatments (column 1) and in the 
within-treatment regression for transparency (column 3). The percentage of high 
status female receivers was 34% in the baseline, 50% in the reputation and, 43% 
in the transparency treatment. 
 
Result 3: Trustworthiness is not driven by reciprocity from the high status 
receivers. No sign of “noblesse oblige” from the high status receivers with 
respect to the low status senders. 
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Table 5: Random-effects ordered probit regressions for trustworthiness- Pooled and 
Specific Samples 
                                                      Proportion returned by Receivers (Yit) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Pooled Baseline Reputation Transparency  
Merit Merit Merit Merit 
Lag Total Proportion Sent -0.103 0.0203 -0.216 -0.106 
  (0.117) (0.140) (0.270) (0.186) 
Lag Total Returned 0.119 0.156 0.182 0.0634 
  (0.128) (0.379) (0.189) (0.211) 
Proportion sent by low status 
sender 0.365 0.516 0.544 0.174 
  (0.267) (0.777) (0.503) (0.247) 
Proportion sent by other low status 
sender 0.160 0.381 0.204 0.0429 
  (0.170) (0.312) (0.224) (0.288) 
Outcome of Die (Rule) 0.0543 -0.0459 0.0894 0.0817 
  (0.0376) (0.0288) (0.0645) (0.0599) 
Baseline Merit Treatment Ref - - - 
Reputation Merit Treatment 0.167 - - - 
  (0.346) - - - 
Transparency Merit Treatment 0.179 - - - 
  (0.387) - - - 
Period -0.0232*** -0.0327** -0.0208 -0.0210** 
  (0.00779) (0.0129) (0.0150) (0.0107) 
Female -0.540** -0.749 -0.365* -0.656 
  (0.210) (0.824) (0.210) (0.405) 
British -0.102 -0.532 0.264 -0.0177 
  (0.358) (1.140) (0.185) (0.590) 
Log pseudo likelihood -1318.2005 -298.9212 -440.8670 -553.4704 
Observations 958 248 321 389 
Number of individuals 38 12 12 14 
Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
3.2. The impact of social information in investment decisions 	
3.2.1. Reputation of the high status receiver 
 
In the reputation merit treatment, low status senders get information about the 
reputation of the high status receiver (i.e. the average proportion returned to both 
low status senders in the previous period) before making their own decisions. In 
table 4 (column 1) the proportion sent in the reputation merit treatment is not 
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significantly affected by the ex ante information compared with the baseline 
merit. Consistent with result 1 and as showed in Figure 3, the lack of reciprocity 
leads to situations in which no trust is displayed, particularly in the second part of 
the experiment. As suggested on table 4, we observe that the reputation of the 
high status receiver has a positive and significant impact on the level of trust. 
Figure 5 represents a frequency matrix comparing the proportion sent according to 
the reputation of the receiver. 	
 
Figure 5: matrix of frequencies of the proportion sent related to the reputation of the 
receiver 
 	
Figure 5 strongly suggests that the proportion sent increases with high status 
receiver’s reputation merit, albeit less than proportionally. When the reputation of 
the receiver with status is high (more than 60% to 100%), the modal is to send 
40% of the endowment. 
Table 6 shows the determinants of trust within-treatment for the baseline merit, 
reputation merit and transparency merit. The outcome of the die has a significant 
and positive effect in the decisions of low status senders. 
Besides, we control for demographic variables. We observe that low status female 
senders tend to give less than males in the baseline merit and in the transparency 
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merit treatment, however statistically significant only in the baseline. This is not 
the case in the reputation merit condition: female participants tend to send 
significantly more than males15.  
 
Table 6: Random effects ordered probit regressions for trust- treatment-specific samples 
                     Proportion Sent by Senders (Xit) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  
Baseline 
Merit 
Reputation 
Merit 
Transparency 
Merit 
Outcome of the die (Rule) 0.119** 0.140*** 0.259*** 
  (0.0472) (0.0390) (0.0360) 
Receiver with no reputation16 - -0.5751 - 
    (0.196)   
Reputation of the high status receiver - 0.4779* - 
    (0.2566)   
Senders receive equal proportions   Ref 
    
Sender receives more than the other 
sender -   0.6985*** 
      (0.170) 
Sender receives less than the other sender -   0.4284*** 
      (0.0805) 
Period -0.0201 -0.0185 -0.0177 
  (0.0153) (0.0130) (0.0153) 
Female -0.667** 0.5753 -0.3985 
  (0.304) (0.3625) (0.3224) 
British -0.0175 -0.1810 0.0942 
  (0.501) (0.5672) (0.1884) 
Log pseudo likelihood -548.10422  -652.9555 -839.30545 
Observations 480 480 560 
Number of indiv 24 24 28 
Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Reputation of the receiver, consistently with Table 4 and Figure 5, has a positive 
and significant impact on investment decisions. Table 7 reports for each potential 
reputation of the high status receiver, the frequencies and the predicted 
probabilities to observe respectively no trust (X=0) and total trust (X=1), using the 
model of Table 6 column (2). Our model predicts that the probability for a low 																																																								
15 The percentages of low status female senders are 71% in the baseline merit, 62% in the 
reputation merit and, 54% in the transparency merit treatment. 
16 Receivers that did not receive any endowment in previous period could not make any choice 
and therefore did not build any reputation. As such, senders were only informed that the receiver 
could not make any choice. 
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status sender to send nothing is reduced in 10.88 percentage points when the 
reputation is 0% rather than 100%. In the same way, the predicted probability of 
send everything increases from 6.13%, when the reputation is 0%, to 13.69% 
when the reputation is 100%. 
	
	
Result 4: In the reputation merit treatment, investment decisions are directly 
related with the reputation of the high status receiver.  
	
 
Table 7: Predicted probabilities for the trust 
Reputation Frequency Predicted probability for no trust 
(X=0) 
Predicted probability for full trust 
(X=1) 
0% 37 .2218*** .0613*** 
10% 23 .2088*** .0669*** 
20% 33 .1963*** .0730*** 
30% 22 .1842*** .0794*** 
40% 25 .1726***          .0863*** 
50% 15 .1615*** .0936*** 
60% 4 .1508*** .1013*** 
70% 2 .1406*** .1095*** 
80% 2 .1309 *** .1182*** 
90% 0 .1217 *** .1237 *** 
100% 1 .1130 *** .1369 *** 
Notes: the reputation of the high status receiver is displayed to the two low status senders, but 
reported only once in this table. Predicted probabilities are computed for average values of every 
variable except reputation of the high status receiver and no reputation 
*90% significance ** 95% significance *** 99% significance 
 
 
 
 
3.2.2 Social comparison 
 
In the transparency merit treatment, the low status sender receives information 
about the proportion returned to her and to the other sender. Results 1 and 2 show 
that trust is higher in the transparency merit treatment than in the baseline. We 
also reported the determinants of trust in column (2) of Table 4. They suggest that 
low status senders react when they receive less than the other sender in the group, 
but also when they receive more than the other counterpart.  
Column (3) of Table 6 reports the regression for the transparency merit treatment 
and allows us to understand the determinants of trust within the treatment. When 
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receiving less than the other sender from the same high status receiver, individuals 
tend to increase the proportion sent in the following round. This result suggests an 
upward social comparison (i.e. comparison with others who are better off or 
superior) from the senders who received less. This finding is in line with previous 
experimental results in Borzino et al (2015). Senders also trust more when they 
received more than the fellow sender in the previous round compared to the 
baseline, relative to the case in which both receive the same. In a sense, 
competition between the low status senders makes senders who received the 
higher return to increase the amount invest in order to keep receiving generous 
return from receivers in the following round. This finding is consistent with the 
“competition for cooperation hypothesis” as in Cassar and Rigdon (2011). 
Social comparison increases trust. Inequality in the reciprocity of the high status 
receivers might boost trust levels of senders in the network without an increase in 
the level of trustworthiness17.  
 
Result 5: In the transparency merit condition, senders receiving less than the 
other sender, tend to invest more in the following round. Furthermore, senders 
who received more than the other sender also tend to increase the level of trust 
relative to the case in which both senders receive the same amount in return. 
Receivers exploit the social comparison and do not increase the returns. 
 
3.3. Compliance  
3.3.1. Compliance from the low status senders 
 
In the previous estimates, we controlled for the outcome of the die and, our results 
suggest that it has a positive and significant effect in the decision of the senders 
(see Tables 4 and 6).  
In table 8, we report the percentage of cases in which low status senders follow 
the rule; send more than the rule and less than the rule per treatment. Our results 
show no significant difference among treatments in following the rule. However, 
senders in the transparency merit treatment, low status senders tend to over-																																																								
17 We have implemented a stranger matching protocol, i.e. participants are re-matched every round 
in network. The small size of our cohort augments the effect of the social information on the level 
of trust. 
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comply (under-comply) with the rule more (less) frequently than in the baseline 
(p=0.0498 and p=0.00297, respectively). 	
Table 8: Descriptive statistics- Compliance to the rule- Low status Senders 
Proportion of senders FOLLOWING the rule 
 Total Baseline merit Reputation merit Transparency merit 
             
30.65% 
 
 
30.20% 
(0.3512) 
 
28,96% 
(0.3447) 
 
32.50% 
(0.3601) 
Proportion of senders SENDING MORE than the rule 
 Total Baseline merit Reputation merit Transparency merit 
  
22.30% 
 
 
16.87% 
(0.2664) 
 
23.33% 
(0.2877) 
 
26.07%** 
(0.2748) 
Proportion of senders SENDING LESS than the rule 
 Total Baseline merit Reputation merit Transparency merit 
 
 
 47.03% 52.91% 
(0.220) 
47.70% 
(0.2205) 
41.42%** 
(0.2439) 
Notes: Standard deviations are displayed in parentheses; Stars report significance level from 
Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney tests run on independent observations (cohorts of 6 participants) to 
confirm differences with the baseline merit treatment. 
*90% significance ** 95% significance *** 99% significance 
 
We do not find any difference in the compliance to the rule in the reputation merit 
treatment compared with the baseline. 
Table 9 reports the results of a regression for the compliance of the rule by low 
status senders. As in Table 8, we do not find any significant difference between 
treatments. However, consistent with Table 8, low status senders send more than 
the rule more often in the transparency merit compared with the baseline. In Table 
9, the variable Outcome of the die (Rule) suggests that, as the suggested rule 
increases, the low status senders tend to follow less the rule. In column 3, we also 
see that female low status senders send significantly more than the rule less often 
than male counterparts. Age is positively related to the compliance of the rule. 
Figure 6 relates the investment decisions with the exogenous rule. Senders tend to 
follow the rule, particularly when the proportion suggested to send is from 0% to 
60%. When the outcome of the die suggests sending more than 60%, the modal is 
to send 0%. This suggests that low status senders follow the rule as long as it 
seems “reasonable” in line with previous experimental findings in Borzino et al 
(2015).  
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Table 9: Random effect probit- Compliance to the rule-Low status Senders 
  Individual decision corresponds the rule suggested by the die 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 
Follow  
the rule 
Send less  
than rule 
Send more  
than rule 
Baseline merit  Ref Ref Ref 
Reputation merit  0.0334 -0.181 0.295 
 
(0.110) (0.202) (0.345) 
Transparency merit  0.183 -0.306** 0.274** 
 
(0.118) (0.226) (0.369) 
Outcome of the die (Rule) -0.153*** 0.559*** -0.559*** 
 
(0.0493) (0.0429) (0.0554) 
Period -0.00774 0.0132 -0.00411 
 
(0.00769) (0.00914) (0.00827) 
Lagged payoff 0.0148 0.114*** -0.185*** 
 
(0.0122) (0.0255) (0.0278) 
Female 0.126 0.190 -0.368** 
 
(0.138) (0.174) (0.181) 
Age -0.0110 -0.0430** 0.0425*** 
 
(0.00946) (0.0167) (0.00683) 
British -0.0160 -0.0266 -0.0190 
 
(0.160) (0.197) (0.185) 
Constant 0.0325 -2.067*** 0.967** 
 
(0.303) (0.424) (0.444) 
Observations 1,439 1,439 1,439 
Number of ind. 76 76 76 
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
 
Compliance to the rule has a negative and significant correlation with period, 
suggesting that the low status senders tend to comply less over time in the 
transparency merit (Spearman’s rho=-0.0912; p=0.0309). However, in the 
baseline merit and in the reputation merit treatments, senders comply to the rule 
more over time but not significantly (Spearman’s rho=0.0051;p=0.9110 and 
Spearman’s rho=0.0203; p=0.6571, respectively). 
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        Figure 6: matrix of frequencies of the proportion sent related to the exogenous rule 
 
 
3.3.2. Compliance from the high status receivers 
 
Our previous regressions suggest that the outcome of the die has no significant 
impact in the decision of the high status receivers in the reputation, transparency 
and baseline treatments (see table 3).  
Table 10 presents the percentage of times in which receivers follow the rule, send 
less and send more than the rule in each treatment. Receivers follow the rule 
slightly more in the reputation merit and in the transparency merit treatment than 
in the baseline merit but these differences are not significant. Receivers also 
return less than the rule in significantly fewer cases in the reputation merit than in 
the baseline merit treatment. No difference is found in the transparency merit 
compared with the baseline merit treatment.  
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Table 10: Descriptive statistics- Compliance to the rule - High status Receivers 
Proportion of receivers FOLLOWING the rule 	 Total Baseline merit Reputation merit Transparency merit 
  
21.71% 
 
 
18.33% 
(0.2819) 
 
 
25.62% 
(0.2697) 
 
21.25% 
(0.2735) 
Proportion of senders RETURNING MORE than the rule 	 Total Baseline merit Reputation merit Transparency merit 
  
14.80% 
 
 
14.16% 
(0.3200) 
 
13.45% 
(0.2107) 
 
16.42% 
(0.2045) 
Proportion of senders RETURNING LESS than the rule 
            Total 
 
Baseline merit Reputation merit Transparency merit 
 63.48% 67.50% 
(0.1340) 
60.83%** 
(0.1973) 
62.32% 
(0.2005) 
Notes: Standard deviations are displayed in parentheses; Stars report significance level from 
Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney tests run on independent observations (cohorts of 6 participants) to 
confirm differences with the baseline treatment. 
*90% significance ** 95% significance *** 99% significance 
 
 
Table 11 displays the regressions for the compliance to the rule by high status 
receivers. Consistent with table 10, high status receivers return more than the rule 
more frequently than in the baseline. However, no significant treatment 
differences are observed when we analyse the decision of follow the rule and send 
more than the rule among treatments. The variable Outcome of the die (Rule) is 
negative and significant in the column (1) suggesting that the higher the suggested 
proportion to send, the lower the tendency to follow this suggestion. High status 
female receivers send less than the suggested rule more than males. 
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Table 11:  Random effect probit- Compliance to the rule- High status Receivers 
  
Individual decision corresponds the rule suggested by the die 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 
Follow  
the rule 
Send less  
than rule 
Send more  
than rule 
Baseline merit  Ref   Ref Ref  
Reputation merit  0.279 -0.614** 0.435 
 
(0.204) (0.239) (0.359) 
Transparency merit  0.0923 -0.493 0.536 
 
(0.187) (0.309) (0.364) 
Outcome of the die (Rule) -0.427*** 0.864*** -0.622*** 
 
(0.0666) (0.103) (0.0857) 
Period -0.00425 0.00883 -0.00647 
 
(0.00816) (0.0109) (0.0129) 
Lagged payoff -0.0247 0.152 -0.271 
 
(0.155) (0.202) (0.242) 
Female 0.122 0.213 -0.524* 
 
(0.323) (0.264) (0.272) 
Age 0.00409 -0.0233 0.0200 
 
(0.00816) (0.0202) (0.0259) 
British -0.114 0.205 -0.0189 
 
(0.134) (0.269) (0.274) 
Constant 0.359 -2.402** 1.367 
 
(1.017) (1.097) (1.757) 
Observations 1,444 1,444 1,444 
Number of indiv 38 38 38 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
  
 
Figure 7 displays the matrix of frequencies linking the proportion returned and the 
outcome of the die. The rule has not a significant effect in the level of 
trustworthiness. Only few high status receivers comply with the rule when it is 
below 50% and then, suggestions related to small return are often followed. 
However, the modal is to return nothing whatever the level of the suggested rule. 
Consistent with Table 5, it appears that the outcome of the die has not a 
significant impact in the decisions of the receivers. 
 
Result 6: The exogenous rule has a positive and significant impact on senders’ 
decisions. The rule has not a significant impact in the decisions of receivers 
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Figure 7: matrix of frequencies of the proportion returned related to the exogenous rule 
 
 
4. Conclusion  
 
Trust is an essential component of economic and social interactions. For this 
reason trust has been extensively studied in the economic literature, particularly in 
the experimental one since Berg et al (1995) introduced the first trust game. In 
this game, two players interact in a full information setting. However, there are 
plenty of examples in real life where more than one sender exchange with one 
receiver. Previous experimental works studied trust and trustworthiness between 
two senders and one receiver in a network with complete information (Buskens et 
al., 2010; Cassar and Rigdon, 2011). Their findings suggest that full information 
regarding actions and outcomes in the network have a positive and significant 
impact in the level of trust and trustworthiness. However, it is quite rare to find 
situations in real life in which the information available to the players is complete. 
In this line, Borzino et al (2015) implemented a controlled laboratory study in 
which two senders interact repeatedly with a receiver in a three-node network 
with minimal manipulation of the social information available to the senders 
about the performance of the receiver in that particular round or in the previous 
round, according to the treatment.  
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Borzino et al (2015) introduced a non-binding recommendation to participants 
about the proportion to invest or return.  Their findings suggest that the 
recommendation has a positive and significant impact on the decisions. The 
suggested rule has two main characteristics: fair and [partially] efficient. Fair 
because, by following the suggestion, the players guarantee equal expected 
payoffs and, [partially] efficient because even when the suggestion generates 
moderate efficiency gains, they could decide not to follow the rule and send 
(return) even more than the proportion suggested expanding the collective 
welfare. The fact that participants voluntarily comply with the rule reiterates 
previous experimental studies related to aversion of dishonesty (e.g. Gnezzy, 
2005; Sanchez-Pages and Vorzatz, 2007; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013).  
We closely replicate the experimental design of Borzino et al (2015), but with the 
implementation of a selection mechanism in order to manipulate the social status 
of the players in the network. Participants complete a task in a trial phase and we 
reward the best performers with prominent role in the experiment of high status 
receivers. Bottom performers are assigned the role of low status senders. We 
evaluate whether social status has an effect on the level of trust and 
trustworthiness in the different information treatments.  
Our findings suggested that reputational information of the high status receiver 
has a significant impact on the level of trust at individual level. In the 
transparency merit treatment, each sender receives information about proportion 
returned to the other low status sender by the same high status receiver in the 
network. We found that the level of trust is significantly higher than in the 
baseline merit treatment. We found that the decision of senders is lead by those 
who received less than the other sender in the network and also by those who 
receive more than the other sender. This finding is consistent with the 
“competition for cooperation hypothesis” formulated by Cassar and Rigdon 
(2011): the low status sender who observes that the other low status sender 
received less than him, tends to increase his level of trust in the following round 
in order to keep the “grace” of the high status receiver. High status receivers take 
advantage of social comparisons generated and keep trustworthiness low.  
We studied the impact of the suggestion in the decision of players. We observed 
that while the non-binding recommendation has a positive and significant impact 
on the level of trust, it does not have a significant effect in the receivers’ 
decisions. 
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Overall, our experimental offers an important insight about the effect of social 
information in networked investment games when social status is manipulated. 
Across treatments, we do not find signs of reciprocity, and so of “noblesse oblige” 
between receivers and senders. Senders penalize receivers by increasing 
frequency of cases in which no trust is displayed. In fact, in the baseline merit 
condition, the 49,38% of participants’ decisions are in line with the Nash 
equilibrium. The introduction of social information decreases that percentage to 
29.17% in the reputation merit and to 26.61% in the transparency merit. Trust 
could be efficiently increased by social comparison, as well as reputation building 
in a network characterized by differences in status. 
Furthermore, we compared the results from Borzino et al. (2015) (Chapter 1 of 
this thesis) with the results from this current study. The comparison of the two 
studies can be found in the Appendix 1 of this Chapter.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Tax evasion is an illegal concealment of a taxable activity and a worrisome 
phenomenon. Measuring the economic cost of evasion is difficult since agents 
who engage in evasion have incentives to hide their behavior. Tax evasion is an 
economically significant activity and it seems important to understand the 
decision process of taxpayers when they chose between engaging in evasion or 
declaring their real income. Hence, studying the determinants of tax compliance is 
essential to design effective audit policy that deters evasion.  
The initial standard analysis of compliance proposed by Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972) and Yitzhaki (1974) model an isolated taxpayer who maximizes her 
expected utility by facing a decision under risk. This theoretical approach assumes 
that the taxpayers are totally individualist and amoral. However, it is conceivable 
that individual decision of paying taxes depends on the behavior of others in 
community and affected by social norms (Myles and Naylor, 1996; Andreoni et 
al., 1998; Alm and Torgler, 2006; Fortin et al, 2007, Cummings et al., 2009; 
Lefebvre et al, 2014). Social information may have an important effect on tax 
compliance, particularly when the agents are interconnected nodes in a network. It 
is possible that social information has a stronger impact when the individuals 
know who the reference group members are, because they value more the 
behavior of individuals they know better (Lefebvre et al, 2014). However, 
according to Fortin et al. (2007), research on tax evasion usually ignores “peers 
effects” or “social interaction effects”. This omission is due to the fact that testing 
for such effects is notoriously difficult for two reasons. First, outcomes data rarely 
reveal the reference group composition, whether it is the family, the 
neighborhood, or the work colleagues. Second, even when the group composition 
is known, estimating interaction-based models raises severe identification 
problems (Manski, 1993) and even when identifiable, they may prove hard to be 
estimated (Moffitt, 2001; Durlauf and Cohen-Cole, 2004; Blume and Durlauf, 
2005).  
Experimental studies can be useful in solving these problems (Charness et al., 
2014). Reference groups are naturally defined as participants in a particular lab 
session who share similar characteristics. In fact, the reference group are 
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exogenously imposed and consists of all those who happen to show up in a 
particular session. Every subject interacts with a single well-defined reference 
group of the same size. This new approach allows analysing the social interactions 
in a much easier way than that using survey data or interaction-based models. 
Indeed, because these hardly ever provide any information about their reference 
groups, the analyst often assumes individuals interact with those who share 
similar attributes: age, education, income, vicinity, etc. (eg Van Praag and Frijters, 
1999).  
Recent field and lab experiments (Innes and Mitra, 2013; Lefebvre et al, 2014) 
find evidence that supports the “broken window theory” formulated by Wilson 
and Kelling (1982). According to this theory, signs of disorder generate more 
disorder when people can observe others to violate a social norm (see Keizer et 
al., 2008). A critical mass model also suggests that individuals take part in an 
activity only if a sufficient proportion of the population is engaged in the activity 
(Schelling, 1978). These models suggest that in the domain of taxes high levels of 
compliance in the group (good examples) might have a positive effect on 
individuals, while low levels of compliance (bad examples) might discourage 
them to behave honestly.  
To the best of our knowledge, only a few attempts have been made to document 
the impact of social interaction on tax compliance using experimental data. Fortin 
et al. (2007) tested in a controlled lab experiment the impact of information on the 
other network members’ mean reporting decisions on individual tax compliance. 
They do not find evidence of an endogenous social information effect. Lefebvre et 
al. (2014) conducted lab experiments in Belgium, France and the Netherlands in 
order to study the influence of social information when information about others’ 
average reporting decisions in past sessions is given to subjects. They observe an 
asymmetric effect of the information on tax compliance: high levels of 
compliance do not have a disciplinary effect whereas low levels of compliance 
significantly increase tax evasion for certain audit probabilities which are known 
by the subjects.  
These contrasting results show the need for further investigation of the influence 
of social information on individual behavior. Indeed, we know little about how 
compliance information is diffused through different network structures, 
particularly when the information is positive (i.e. I know that a node, which is 
connected to me in the network, has been audited and found totally honest). 
Therefore, it is not clear if the disciplinary impact of good examples is 
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comparable with the deteriorating effect of bad examples. This is particularly 
interesting because diffusion of information is free (in terms of auditing costs), 
and it could be effective in order to deter tax evasion (Fellner et al., 2013).  
If information travels faster than sanctions, tax agencies may implement 
successful deterrence strategies at a reduced cost (this is particularly true for large 
and complex societies where auditing is expensive). 
In this paper, we test whether social information has an effect on the level of 
compliance in a fixed-six-nodes circle network, particularly when the information 
diffused is positive (compliant behavior), and negative (un-compliant behavior). 
To analyze whether individuals have the same attitude towards tax evasion, we 
run an experiment with four information conditions: No Info, Full Info, Positive 
Info and Negative Info. In the No info treatment, individuals get individual 
information about whether they have been audited, the outcome of it and their 
final payoff. In the Positive Info (Negative Info) treatment, participants receive 
information whether the nodes connected to them have been audited and found 
compliant (noncompliant). In the Full Info, participants receive both positive and 
negative signals. 
Our design has four interesting features. First, following Fortin et al (2007), 
individual monetary payoffs do not depend on the other participants’ behavior, 
which allows us to isolate better the effect of social information in the network. In 
all our treatments, taxes and fines do not provide any public good, so there is no 
group externality linked with compliance and taxes do not change the distribution 
of income. Second, we will specifically control for the effect of signals on 
participants’ beliefs on the ex-ante fixed and unknown probability of being 
audited by asking them using an incentive compatible mechanism. This feature 
increases the external validity of our study given that the audit probability is also 
unknown by the taxpayers in real life. Third, we keep a fixed tax rate and fine 
rates fixed and known by the subjects. And fourth, we use a real effort task. As 
suggested by recent experimental literature (Bruggen and Strobel, 2007), 
providing subjects with endowments like “manna from heaven” seems to affect 
their behavior compared with the case in which subjects are asked to perform 
some easy tasks to gather their endowments. Looking at experiments on taxation, 
a common result is that the adoption of a real effort procedure usually leads to 
higher levels of tax compliance. Also, such characteristic increases its external 
validity making the experiment less artificial. 
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Our results suggest that receiving positive signals (good examples) and negative 
signals (bad examples) have a significant effect on the levels of reporting and full 
compliance at individual level. However, results are mixed at aggregate level. 
Average compliance is lower in the Negative Info compared with the No Info, 
Full Info and Positive Info. The average subjective audit probability stated by the 
subjects is also lower in the Negative Info in comparison with the three other 
information treatments.  
These results suggest that the low compliance in the Negative Info treatment 
could be explained by the low subjective audit probability. Non-strong (by being 
only one) negative signals received in the previous rounds by the subjects have 
negative and significant change on full compliance and reporting decisions in the 
Negative Info compared with the case of having received no signals in the prior 
round. This result suggests that bad examples may have a contagious effect in the 
network. Instead, strong (by being two) positive signals have a positive and 
significant effect on the level of reporting and full compliance decisions compared 
with no signals received in the previous period in the Positive Info. This result 
suggests that positive signals and so, good examples may have a disciplinary 
effect on the level of compliance and reporting decisions. The impact of positive 
signals in the Positive Info treatment as well as the effect of negative signals in 
the Negative info cannot be explained by a significant change in the subjective 
probability of being audit compared with the case of no signals received in the 
previous round.  
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 described our 
experimental design and procedures. Section 3 reports the experimental results 
while Section 4 concludes this paper. 
 
 
2. The experimental design and procedures  
 
2.1. The experiment 
 
The purpose of our experiment is to specifically test whether different 
informational signals have an effect on the level of compliance. We run an 
experiment with four information conditions: No Info, Full Info, Positive Info and 
Negative Info. We implement these four treatments in a fixed circle network of 6 
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participants where each individual is connected to the adjacent neighbors. The 
network determines the observational structure, that is, after each round, the 
subjects are only able to receive information from their connected neighbors18 
(see Figure 1).  
 
 
         Figure 1: Circle network with 6 nodes 
 
Without a positive group externality, individuals’ payoffs do not depends on other 
subjects’ behavior. This feature of our design allows us to isolate better the effect 
of social information in the network (Fortin et al, 2007). We also use an incentive 
compatible mechanism in order to control for the effect of signals on participants’ 
beliefs on the ex-ante fixed and unknown probability of being audited. Besides, 
we implement a real effort task. Experiments on taxation shows that the adoption 
of a real effort procedure usually leads to higher levels of tax compliance making 
the experiment less artificial (Bruggen and Strobel, 2007). 
 
2.2. The tax game 
 
The sequence of each experimental round of the Tax game proceeds as 
follow: 
• Stage1- Real effort task: Participants complete a real effort task at the 
beginning of each round (adding two digits numbers for one minute). After 
completing the task, their score is multiplied by a random factor, which can be 
50, 100 or 150 (Lefevbre et al. 2014). 																																																								
18 The network structure is known by the subjects. Figure 1 was introduced in the 
instructions and showed in stage 2 of each round (see section 2.2).   
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• Stage 2 – Reporting decision: Participants know their income and report any 
fraction of it. Reported income pays a flat tax rate of 25%.  
• Stage 3- Belief elicitation: Participants are asked to guess the probability of 
being audited in the next stage by choosing a number from 0 to 100. If the 
guess is within the interval ±10 of the real probability (i.e. p=0.25), 
participants are rewarded at the end of the experiment with no feedback.  
• Stage 4- Audit: Participants are audited with a probability of 0.25. This 
probability is unknown by subjects and it is kept constant across the 
treatments. If an untruthful declaration of income is detected, a fine has to be 
paid. The fine is determined by the difference between the reported income 
and their endowment, which represents the amount evaded in that particular 
round.  
In the No info treatment, subjects are only informed whether they were 
audit of not and their payoff at the end of each round. In the other three 
treatments, additional informational signals are given to the subjects from the two 
nodes connected to them in the circle network. Further description of the 
treatments will be given in section 2.3.  
 
2.2.1. Expected utility and payoffs 
 
We consider a subject i, who is part of a network of six members. Given 
that each subjects in each round may earn 0, 2, 4, 6, 8 or 10 points in the real 
effort task,19 which is multiplied by one of the random factors: 50, 100 or 150,20 
the expected gross income is 1000 ECU. 
Subjects are given the chance to evade taxes, where the individual evasion 
is given by: 
 𝐸!,! = max  [ 𝑡!,!; 0]                                             (1) 
 
with t being the flat tax rate of 0,25 paid by subject i in round t, and 𝐸!,! = 𝑌!,! −  𝐼!,!,  where  𝑌!,! is the initial endowment and 𝐼!,! the reported income.  																																																								
19 In the 94.82% of the observations, subjects earn 10 points in the real effort task at the beginning 
of each round. 
20 This aims at capturing different possible gross incomes. 
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Audit probability is exogenous and defined by p=0.25 which is unknown 
and equal for all subjects. Therefore, individuals must determine how much 
income to report by estimating the probability of being audited (𝑝!). If an audit 
occurs and tax evasion is detected (i.e. 𝐸!,! >0), the subject has to pay immediately 
a fine 𝜆, which is 100% of 𝐸!,!.  Hence: 
 𝜆 =  1    if an audit occurs,0                  otherwise                                         (2) 
 
The expected utility, 𝐸[𝑈!], is defined to be: 
 𝐸[𝑈!] = 𝑝!  𝑈 𝑌! − 𝑡𝐼!, − 𝜆𝐸! + 1− 𝑝!  𝑈 𝑌! − 𝑡𝐼! .                (3) 
 
This equation represents the private expected value associated with tax 
compliance when the subject makes a choice in the amount to declare (𝐼!). 
Assuming that the subject is risk averse, the private utility U(.) is increasing and 
concave in the consumption. By taking the first order derivate with respect to 𝐼! 
and rearranging, a maximizing agent declare their full income Y=I, if  
 𝑝! > !! = 𝑝 = 0.25                                                       (4) 
 
As long as the expected probability of being audited exceeds the threshold value 
of 0.25, agents have no incentive to evade. If the expected below is strictly below 
the threshold, agents evade in full. Interestingly, if agents fully anticipate the true 
probability of being audited (we adjusted the probability of being audited to 0.25 
in all treatments) agents are indifferent between evading and complying. 21 
In each period, subjects’ experimental payoff is equal to 𝑌!,! net of taxes that they 
pay after the declaration and sanction (if audited). We randomly select one of the 
20 periods to compute earnings and the individual payoff from the game is given 
by: 
 𝜋!,! = 𝑌!,! − 𝐼×𝑡!,! − 𝜆(𝑌!,! − 𝐼!,!)                                          (5) 
 
 																																																								
21 An alternative model could consider Bayesian updating of beliefs. As we concentrate on the 
comparative statics analysis of our experimental results, we leave this model to a different paper 
we are currently working in. 
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2.3. Treatments 
 
We manipulate the informational signals in the following way: 
• In the No Info treatment, at the end of each round, subjects are just 
informed on whether they have been audited and on their net payoffs. This means 
that the subjects know the final individual benefits post-taxes. 
• In the Full Info treatment, at the end of each round, they have the 
same information than in the No Info treatment but, they have also information 
whether their neighbors connected to them were audited or not, and the outcome 
of the audition (i.e., if she was fully honest or not). Therefore, positive and 
negative signals are diffused. 
• In the Positive Info treatment, at the end of each round, the 
subjects have the same information than in the No Info treatment and besides they 
are informed whether their connected neighbors were audited and found fully 
honest. This means that only positive signals are diffused. 
• In the Negative Info treatment, at the end of each round, the 
subjects have the same information than in the No Info treatment and besides they 
are informed whether their connected neighbors were audited and found 
dishonest. This means that only negative signals are diffused. 
 
2.4. Procedures 
 
All our treatments follow a partners matching protocol, that is, the group 
composition is kept constant. Moreover, the subjects’ positions within the 
network are randomly determined at the beginning of the experiment and kept 
fixed throughout all the rounds (fixed position). The group size is always of 6, 
following a partner matching protocol and the game is repeated for 20 rounds. We 
have 9 independent observations per treatment and 54 subjects per cell (4 sessions 
of 18 subjects for each treatment). In total, 216 subjects participate in the 
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experiment. The average payment of each subject was £13. The experiment was 
computerized in Z-tree (Firshbacher, 2007). 
 
 
3. Results  
 
The 216 subjects were equally distributed across treatment in 9 networks of 6 
participants, making a total of 54 subjects per treatment. Table 1 display that 
samples are well balanced across all treatments with respect to age, gender, 
Europeans (including British participants) and students from the faculty of Social 
Sciences.  No significant differences were found across treatments.  
 
Table 1: Demographics characteristics- Full sample- Means and standard deviations 
 
No Info    Full Info Positive Info Negative Info 
 
Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd 
Gender: female 0.63 0.48 0.59 0.49 0.59 0.49 0.57 0.49 
Social Sciences 0.37 0.48 0.46 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.48 0.49 
Europeans 0.63 0.48 0.62 0.48 0.61 0.48 0.61 0.48 
Age [years] 21.24 3.33 20.79 2.52 22.27 3.89 22.09 5.52 
 
Table 2 reports the results for the average proportion of reported endowment, 
average full compliance and subjective probability of being audited in percentage 
for each treatment. In table 2, Wilcoxon Mann Whitney test were computed on 
independent observations (network) in order to test significant differences 
between treatments. The first part of Table 2 illustrates the average proportion of 
endowment reported in the each treatment. The first column displays the results 
for the whole experiment and we observe that proportion of endowment reported 
is lower in the Negative Info compared with the No Info, Full Info and Positive 
Info treatments. However, this is only significant when we compare the Negative 
Info with the Full Info treatment (p=0.0476).  
From column 2 to column 5, we show the average reported endowment in each 
block of 5 rounds. We observe that the average proportion reported in the 
Negative Info is significantly lower compared with the Full Info treatment in the 
1-5 rounds and in the 11-15 and 16-20 rounds of the experiment (p=0.099; 
p=0.0243 and, p=0.0152, respectively). We found also a significant difference 
between the Full Info and the No info treatment in the first 5 rounds (p=0.099) 
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and between the Positive Info and the Negative Info treatment in the last 5 rounds 
(p=0.0851). 
 
Table 2: Average proportion of endowment reported; full compliance and stated 
subjective audit probability by treatment 
          Average proportion of endowment reported    
 Rounds   
 
Treatments All 20 1-5 6-10 11-15 
 
16-20 
 
     0% 
reported 
(All 20) 
 
 No info 0.628 0.636 0.627 0.616 0.634 13.50% 
     (0.419) (0.392) (0.418) (0.435) (0.430)   Full info  0.692 0.689 0.671 0.696 0.709 11.70% 
 
 (0.394) (0.4050 (0.401) (0.402) (0.024)   Positive Info 0.636 0.659 0.651 0.596 0.636 18.20% 
 
 (0.424) (0.425) (0.402) (0.440 (0.428)   Negative Info 0.55 0.582 0.575 0.498 0.545 18.00% 
 
 (0.43) (0.412) (0.421) (0.443) (0.439)                                            Average proportion of Full Compliance    
 Rounds     All 20 1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20   No info  0.459 0.392 0.463 0.467 0.515 
      (0.498) (0.489) (0.499) (0.499) (0.5) 
  Full info  0.499 0.452 0.47 0.522 0.552 
   (0.5) (0.498) (0.5) (0.498) (0.5)   Positive Info 0.472 0.455 0.488 0.456 0.489 
   (0.499) (0.498) (0.5) (0.498) (0.5)   Negative Info 0.35 0.356 0.352 0.326 0.366   
 (0.477) (0.479) (0.4780 (0.469) (0.482)                 
 Average proportion of Subjective audit Probability  
 Rounds 
 All 20 1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 
First Last 
Only Only 
         
No info  0.4057 0.4015 0.3936 0.4029 0.4247 0.3737 0.458 
    (0.264) (0.249) (0.263) (0.282) (0.259) (0.202) (0.271) 
Full info  0.3964 0.4068 0.3783 0.4036 0.397 0.3844 0.398 
 (0.247) (0.237) (0.272) (0.2626) (0.258) (0.198) (0.275) 
Positive Info 0.3951 0.3936 0.413 0.4038 0.3701 0.3496 0.398 
 (0.256) (0.228) (0.272) (0.262) (0.258) (0.1829) (0.257) 
Negative Info 0.3461 0.3669 0.358 0.3355 0.3243 35.96 0.314 
 (24.04) (0.229) (0.241) (0.2513) (0.237) (0.197) (0.242) 
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In column 6, we observe that the percentage of cases in which nothing is reported. 
Subjects in the Full Info report significantly more positive proportions of their 
endowment compared with the Negative Info treatment. 
As signals are sent only when subjects fully report all their income (when 
positive), or when they fail to do so (negative ones), in the second part of Table 2, 
we display the average proportion only for the 100% of endowment reported (full 
compliance). In the column, we observe that proportion of cases in which the 
whole endowment is reported is lower in the Negative Info compared with the No 
Info, Full Info and Positive Info, however not significantly. The proportion of full 
compliance is significantly higher in the Positive Info in the rounds from 6-10 
compared with the Negative Info (p=0.0922) and, in the Full Info compared with 
the Negative info in the rounds from 11-15 and 16-20 (p=0.0693 and p=0.0615, 
respectively). 
 
 
Figure 2: Average proportion of endowment reported in block of five rounds by treatment 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the average proportion of endowment reported by subjects in each 
block of five rounds by treatment. As we display in Table 2, we observe that 
subjects in the Negative Info report less than in the Full Info, Positive Info and No 
Info. The proportion of endowment reported does not vary significantly over time 
in the No Info (Spearman’s rho=0.0227; p=0.4557), Full Info (Spearman’s 
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rho=0.0447; p=0.1424), Positive Info (Spearman’s rho= -0.0121; p=0.6908) and 
in the Negative Info (Spearman’s rho=-0.0485; p=0.1115). 
 
Figure 2 shows that the average proportion of full compliance is lower in the 
negative Info compared to the Full Info, Positive Info and No Info treatment in 
each block of five periods of the game. We observe that the average full 
compliance increases over time in the Full Info treatment (Spearman’s 
rho=0.0811; p=0.0077) and in the No Info (Spearman’s rho=0.0870; p=0.0042). 
Conversely, full compliance does not vary over time in the Positive Info 
(Spearman’s rho=0.0232; p=0.4471) and in the Negative Info (Spearman’s rho=-
0.0020; p=0.9471). 
 
 
        Figure 3: Average proportion of full compliance in block of five rounds by 
treatment 
 
As the expected probability of being audited play a crucial role in the decisions of 
our participants, in the last part of Table 2, we report the results for the belief 
elicitation of the subjective probability of being audited in each period before the 
participants make their reporting decisions. In the first column, we observe that 
the stated subjective probability in the Negative Info is lower than the No Info, 
Positive Info and Negative Info treatment, but only significant compared with the 
Full info treatment (p=0.098). This means that the lower average reported 
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endowment and average proportion of full compliance is principally driven by a 
lower subjective audit probability in the Negative Info. Column 4 and 5 display 
the percentage of the subjective probability in the last part of the experiment 
(round 11-15 and 16-20). We observe that, from round 11 to 15, average stated 
subjective audit probability in the Positive Info is significantly higher than in the 
Negative Info (p=0.097), while in the rounds from 16 to 20, the average beliefs is 
significantly higher in the No Info treatment than in the Full Info (p=0.0280), 
Positive Info (p=0.0182) and in the Negative Info (p=0.006).  
 
 
Figure 4: Average proportion of stated subjective probability in block of five rounds by 
treatment 
 
Figure 3 shows the beliefs about the subjective probability are lower in the 
Negative Info compared with the Full Info, Positive Info and No Info in each 
block of five periods. The stated subjective audit probability significantly 
decreases over time in the Negative Info (Spearman’s rho=-0.0928; p=0.0023), 
while it does not significantly vary in the No Info (Spearman’s rho=0.0326; 
p=0.2848), in the Positive Info (Spearman’s rho=-0.0479; p=0.1160) and in the 
Full Info (Spearman’s rho=-0.0025; p=0.9353). 
In the last part of Table 2, we also compare the stated beliefs in the first round and 
in the last round across treatments (see column 6 and 7). We show that there are 
not significant differences across treatments when we compare the average stated 
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beliefs in the first round. This means that the individuals’ beliefs before starting 
the game are not significantly different across treatments. However, we observe 
that there are significant differences when we compare the stated subjective 
probability only in round 20 (last round) in the information treatments with 
respect to the baseline (No Info). The mean of stated audit probability is 
marginally smaller in the Positive Info (39.80%; p=0.095) and Negative Info 
(31.40%; p=0.0071) than in the No Info treatment (45.80%). The mean stated 
probability is also higher in the Positive Info compared with the Negative Info 
(p=0.0380). 
 
Result 1: In line with the existence of network spillovers, the expected audit 
probability decreases over time in the Negative Info. Receiving only negative 
signals from the connected links in the network makes the beliefs about the 
subjective audit probability decrease in the Negative Info compared with an 
environment, in which both positive and negative information (good and bad 
examples) are disseminated. 
 
3.1. The Signals  
 
In our experiment, subjects update their beliefs about the subjective audit 
probability after receiving individual information whether they have been audited 
or not at the end of each round and, after getting two signals from the adjacent 
players connected with them in the network (one from each of them). The signals 
can be Positive, Negative and No signal. In the No Info treatment, individuals 
receive only individual outcome of the audit and get no signals from their 
neighbors. In the Full Info, players receive signals from the each connected links, 
which can be (one or two) Positive, (one or two) Negative, Mixed (one positive 
and one negative) and No signal. Note that participants receive a Positive Signal if 
the neighbor has been audited and found fully honest, otherwise No signal is 
received from that node; a Negative signal whether the adjacent node has been 
audited and found dishonest, otherwise No signal is received from that neighbor. 
Mixed signal if the player receives one positive and one negative signal from the 
two players linked to her.  
In table 3, we report the total frequency and the percentage of each signal and the 
audits received by the subjects in each treatment.  
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Table 3: Total amount of audits and signals by treatment- frequency and percentage 
 No Info Full Info Positive Info Negative Info 
 Freq. % Freq. % 
Freq
. % Freq. % 
Audits 266 24.62 271 25.09 271 25.09 263 24.35 
Type of 
Signal         
One Positive - - 214 19.81 222 20.55 - - 
Two Positive - - 19 1.76 11 1.02 - - 
One Negative - - 200 18.52 - - 296 27.40 
Two 
Negative - - 13 1.20 - - 32 2.96 
None 1080 100 602 55.74 847 78.43 752 69.63 
Mixed - - 32 2.96 - - - - 
 
We find that there is not a significant difference between the proportion of one 
and two positive signals in the Full Info compared with the Positive Info 
(p=0.8474 and p=0.8719, respectively).  The proportion of one negative signals 
received by the subjects in the negative Info is significantly higher than in the Full 
info treatment (p=0.0228), however there is not a significant difference between 
the proportion of two negative signals received in the Negative Info compared 
with the ones received in the Full info (p=0.7293). We observe that in the Positive 
Info the overall proportion of positive signals is significantly lower than negative 
signals in the Negative Info (p=0.0171). In the Positive Info, subjects receive 
significantly more “no signals” than in the Negative Info (p=0.0001). The 
frequency of negative signals is significantly higher in the No Info treatment than 
in the Full Info (p=0.0049).  The total amount of audits does not significantly 
differ across treatment. 
 
Result 2: Bad examples (negative signals) are significantly more frequent than 
good examples (positive signals) when we compare the Positive Info and Negative 
Info treatments. This means that there is more evasion in the Negative Info than in 
the Positive Info treatment. However, the total amount of audits is not 
significantly different across treatments. 
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3.2. Beliefs and reporting decisions 
 
Figure 1 displays the linear predictions for the average reporting decisions and 
average estimated probability of audit by individual for the whole game in each 
treatment. We observe that there is a direct relationship between the average 
individual reporting decision and the average stated probability in the No Info, 
Full info and Negative Info, but not in the Positive Info. Spearman correlations 
between the average reporting decisions and the average beliefs about the audit 
probability by individual is positive and significant in the Full Info (rho=0.1873; 
p=0.000) and in the Negative info (rho=0.0692; p=0.0230), but insignificant in the 
No info treatment (rho=0.0129; p=0.1873). However, the correlation is negative 
and significant in the positive info (rho=-0.0861; p=0.0046).  
 
 
Figure 5: Linear predictions of the average beliefs and average reporting decisions by 
individual across treatments 
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3.3. Beliefs and full compliance decisions 
 
Figure 2 shows the linear prediction of average estimated probability of being 
audited and number of full compliance decisions by individual in the 20 periods in 
each treatment. We observe the number of decisions of full compliance by 
individual has a positive and significant relationship with their belief about the 
subjective probability of being audited in the Full Info (Spearman rho=0.0597; 
p=0.0499). Conversely, we observe that this relationship is negative and 
significant in the Positive Info (Spearman’s rho=-0.1291; p=0.000) and in the 
Negative Info (Spearman rho=-0.0917; p=0.0025). In the No info, average 
individual decisions of full compliance are also negatively related to the average 
stated subjective audit probability, but not significantly (Spearman’s rho=-0.0471; 
p=0.1221). 
Figure 2 also presents separately the average beliefs of subjects who complied in 
all the 20 rounds of game with those who did not. The average beliefs of 
subjective the audit probability of totally honest players is 49.35% in the Negative 
Info; 34.46% in the Full Info; 27.75% in the Positive Info and; 18.15% in the 
Negative Info treatment. Conversely, the average beliefs of the totally dishonest 
players is 45% in the No Info; 11.40% in the Full Info; 37.22% in the Positive 
Info and; 21.80% in the Negative Info treatment. This means that, in the Full Info 
treatment, totally honest subjects tend to overestimate significantly the probability 
of being audited compared with non-compliant subjects (p=0.0372).  
 
This result is consistent with preferences to conform to others so that higher 
beliefs about the probability of audit are related to higher expectation about others 
compliance after receiving positive or negative signals. At the same time higher 
compliance expectations about others compliance may lead to more compliance. 
Another explanation is that the pattern could reflect a false consensus effect 
whereby people tend to overestimate the extent to which their own behavior is 
also exhibited by others (Ross et al., 1977). Conversely, we do not observe the 
same pattern in the Positive Info: totally honest subjects decide to comply in the 
whole game even though their beliefs about the audit probability are significantly 
lower than totally dishonest subjects (p=0.0793). Instead, we do not observe a 
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significant difference between the average subjective probability of the totally 
honest and totally dishonest players in the No Info and Negative Info treatments. 
 
The percentage of subjects who reported 100% of their endowment (totally 
honest) in the 20 periods is 14.8% in the No Info, 5% in the Full Info, 9.2% in the 
Positive Info and 5% in the Negative Info. Conversely, the percentage of subject 
who never did full compliance was 18.5% in the No Info, 1.6% in the Full Info, 
11.1% in the Positive Info and 16.6% in the Negative Info. 
 
 
Figure 6: Linear predictions of average beliefs and number of decisions of full 
compliance by individual across treatments 
 		
Result 3: Totally honest subjects, who fully comply the 20 rounds, overestimate in 
average the subjective audit probability compared than totally dishonest 
counterparts in the Full Info. Conversely, we observe the reverse pattern in the 
Positive Info. Totally compliant subjects believe that the subjective audit 
probability is significantly lower than totally non-compliant subjects. Instead, 
there is not a significant difference on the average beliefs between the totally 
honest players and the totally dishonest ones in the No Info and in the Negative 
Info treatments. 
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3.4. Econometric analysis 
 
Table 4 reports detailed econometric regressions for the proportion of endowment 
reported, full compliance and beliefs of the subjective probability of being audited 
across treatments. We compare three information treatment (Full Info, Positive 
Info and Negative Info) with the No Info treatment in which only individual 
information is available to the participants and so a natural baseline. The 
dependent variable “Proportion Reported” is a continuous variable from 0 to 1 
indicating the proportion of endowment reported by the subjects; “Full 
compliance” is a binary dependent variable indicating whether the 100% of the 
endowment was declared or not; and “Subjective probability” is a continuous 
variable from 0 to 1 that indicate the proportion of the stated subjective audit 
probability22. We also control for period to account for learning effects.  
 
Column (1) presents the results for the reported endowment for the 20 periods. 
We do not observe a treatment effect when we compare the Full Info, the Positive 
Info and the Negative Info treatment with the No Info treatment, which is our 
reference. The proportion of the endowment reported tends to decrease but not 
significantly over time. In Column (2), we observe that subjects make full 
compliance significantly less in the Negative Info than in the No Info treatment. 
Reporting decisions are higher in the Positive and Full Info treatments compared 
with the No Info, but not significantly. We also see that the individuals tend to 
significantly increase their decisions of declaring 100% of their endowment over 
time.  
 
Column (3) reports the results for the estimated subjective probability and it is 
observed that beliefs about the audit probability are significantly lower in the 
Negative Info compared with the No Info treatment. This result suggests that 
subjects make full compliance significantly less in the Negative Info than in the 
No Info treatment because their beliefs about the subjective probability are 																																																								
22 Subjects can report any amount from 0 up to their endowment and can state the subjective 
probability as any probability from 0% to 100%. Given the nature of these two dependent 
variables, we decide to run in Table 3 random effect linear regressions clustering by independent 
observation (network of 6 players). Instead, the dependent variable “full compliance” is a binary 
variable, which can take value of 1 (100% of endowment reported) or 0 otherwise. We decide to 
run for this variable a random effect probit model clustering by independent observation.  
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significantly lower than in the No Info. Beliefs in the Positive and Full Info are 
lower than in the No Info treatment, however not significantly. 
 
Result 4: Individuals subjective audit probability is significantly lower in the 
Negative Info than in the No info treatment. This result drives subjects to comply 
significantly less in the Negative Info than in the No Info treatment at aggregate 
level. 
 
In columns from (4) to (6), we add additional control variables in order to better 
understand determinants of the reporting decisions, full compliance and belief 
formation at individual level across treatments. We introduce lagged interactive 
variables for each type of signal received by the subjects in the previous round in 
each treatment. These variables are dummies, which capture the effect of each 
type of signal received in the previous round on individual decisions.  
More specifically, in Column (4), we observe that subjects tend to increase 
significantly the proportion reported in t after receiving two negative signals in t-1 
in the Full info treatment (“Lagged Two Negative Signal x Full Info”).  Subjects 
also tend to increase significantly the proportion reported and the full compliance 
after receiving two positive signals in the previous round (“Lagged Two Positive 
Signals x Full Info”) in the Full Info compared with the No Info treatment. This 
result could be driven by a significant increment of their beliefs about the 
subjective audit probability after receiving two positive signals in t-1 (see Column 
6). Subjects also tend to increase their stated subjective probability after receiving 
one negative signal and two mixed signals in the Full Info in comparison with the 
No Info treatment. 
We also introduce interactive variables for the lagged signals received in t-1 in the 
Positive treatment. It is displayed that receiving two positive signals in the 
previous round (“Lagged Two Positive signals x Positive Info”) has a negative 
and significant effect in the full compliance decision in the Positive Info 
compared with the No Info. Receiving no signals (“Lagged No signal x Positive 
Info”) or one positive signal in t-1 (“Lagged one Positive signal x Positive Info”) 
affect positively to the decision of fully comply in the Positive Info compared 
with the No Info, but no significantly. In column 6, we show that receiving one or 
two positive signals in the previous round affect positively, but insignificantly, the 
beliefs about the subjective audit probability in the Positive Info compared with 
the No info treatment. 
Table 4: Pooled sample – Random effect linear regression model (proportion reported and subjective 
probability) and random effect probit model (full compliance) both clustering at group level  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
POOLED 1 POOLED 2 
VARIABLES 
Proportion 
Reported  
Full 
Compliance 
Subjective 
Probability 
Proportion 
Reported  
Full 
Compliance 
Subjective 
Probability 
No Info Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref 
Full Info 0.0637 0.210 -0.00926    
 
(0.0473) (0.162) (0.0330)    
Lagged No Signal x 
Full Info    0.0589 0.152 -0.02231 
    (0.0470) (0.174) (0.03361) 
Lagged One Negative 
signals x Full Info 
   
-0.00445 0.0425 0.03857** 
    
(0.0379) (0.131) (0.01761) 
Lagged Two Negative 
Signals x Full Info 
   
0.114** 0.0402 -0.01645 
    
(0.0474) (0.229) (0.04173) 
Lagged One Positive 
signal x Full Info 
   
-0.00950 0.0165 0.00367 
    
(0.0204) (0.122) (0.01713) 
Lagged Two Positive 
Signals x Full Info 
   
0.106* 0.906* 0.07301* 
    
(0.0581) (0.504) (0.04208) 
Lagged Two Mixed  
Signals x Full Info 
   
0.00631 0.293 0.08039*** 
    
(0.0754) (0.221) (0.02856) 
Positive Info 0.00810 0.0731 -0.0105    
 
(0.0576) (0.183) (0.0321)    
Lagged No Signal x 
Positive Info    0.00512 0.0222 -0.01632 
    (0.0606) (0.191) (0.03099) 
Lagged One Positive 
signal x Positive Info 
   
-0.00259 0.0382 0.02950 
    
(0.0397) (0.122) (0.02557) 
Lagged Two Positive 
Signals x Positive Info 
   
0.118 0.843*** 0.02202 
    
(0.0771) (0.255) (0.05238) 
Negative Info -0.0777 -0.429* -0.0595*    
 
(0.0681) (0.254) (0.0342)    
Lagged No Signal x 
Negative Info    -0.0820 -0.455* -0.05543 
    (0.0722) (0.259) (0.03511) 
Lagged One Negative 
signals x Negative Info 
   
-0.000988 -0.0991 -0.02269 
    
(0.0234) (0.0751) (0.01428) 
Lagged Two Negative 
Signals x Negative Info 
   
0.0399 0.445** 0.01691 
    
(0.0705) (0.182) (0.02773) 
Period -0.00113 0.0164*** -0.000580 -9.89e-05 0.0202*** -0.000988 
 
(0.00106) (0.00458) (0.000720) (0.00114) (0.00499) (0.000771) 
Constant 0.640*** -0.345*** 0.412*** 0.628*** -0.384*** 0.4182*** 
 
(0.0372) (0.130) (0.0265) (0.0375) (0.127) (0.02759) 
Log Likelihood 
 
-2109.364 
  
-1986.2848 
 Observations 4,317 4,320 4,320 4,102 4,104 4,104 
Number of ind 216 216 216 216 216 216 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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We now analyze the role of the different signals on the decisions in the Negative 
Info. We observe that receiving no signal in the previous round (Lagged No 
Signal x Negative Info) has a negative effect in the proportion reported, full 
compliance and in the belief of the subjective audit probability. However, these 
effects are only significant on the full compliance decisions when we compare the 
Negative Info with the No Info treatment. One negative signal received in the 
Negative Info in t-1 (Lagged One Negative Signal x Negative Info) has a negative 
effect in the reporting decisions, in the full compliance and in the beliefs of the 
subjective audit probability in the Negative Info compared with the no Info 
treatment, however insignificantly.  
 
Subjects tend to significantly comply more after receiving two negative signals in 
the Negative Info compared with the No Info. They also tend to increase their 
reported endowment and the stated subjective probability but insignificantly. In 
other words, Participants increase full compliance after receiving two signals 
(positive or negatives) in Positive and Negative Info compared with the No Info 
treatment. In the Full Info, two signals increase both full compliance and 
proportion of endowment reported.  
 
Result 5: Receiving two signals about others compliance behavior do encourage a 
higher compliance in the Positive Info, Full Info and Negative Info compared with 
the No info treatment. This suggests that strong (by being two) signals received 
from the connected links in the network have a disciplinary effect on individuals’ 
behavior.  
 
We now explore more about the behavioral determinants of compliance at 
treatment level. Table 5 display results of the within-treatments estimations for 
the No Info and Full Info treatment. We compute regressions for each dependent 
variable: Proportion of endowment reported, full compliance decision and stated 
subjective probability. We also control for the stated probability of being audit 
(Subjective probability) in order to evaluate its effect in the reporting and in the 
full compliance decisions.  
 
However, the parameter estimates of  “Subjective Probability” is biased because 
a simple random effects linear model or probit model omits the potential 
simultaneity between individual reporting decisions with their beliefs about the 
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subjective audit probability. Recall that this bias may arise from the fact that 
individual reporting decisions and, their beliefs feed on one another. In order to 
tackle the simultaneity problem, we implement a simultaneous equation model 
(2SLS) clustering by independent observations (network of 6 players).   
 
Table 5: specific samples for the No Info and Full Info treatment. Simultaneous equation model 
(2SLS) clustering at group level  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
No Info Full Info 
VARIABLES 
Proportion 
Reported  
Full 
Compliance 
Subjective 
probability 
Proportion 
Reported  
Full 
Compliance 
Subjective 
probability 
              
Lagged No Signal 
   
Ref Ref Ref 
       Lagged Positive 
Signal - - - 0.0193 0.0338 -0.00885 
    
(0.0333) (0.0404) (0.0133) 
Lagged Two Positive 
signal - - - 0.0313 0.160 0.0504 
    
(0.113) (0.134) (0.0472) 
Lagged Negative 
Signal - - - -0.00904 0.0114 0.0636*** 
    
(0.0393) (0.0345) (0.0191) 
Lagged Two 
Negative signal - - - 0.0129 -0.0437 -0.0227 
    
(0.0437) (0.0628) (0.0584) 
Lagged Two Mixed 
signal - - - 0.0666 0.120 0.0653* 
    
(0.0751) (0.0841) (0.0368) 
Subjective Probability 0.139 -0.117 - 0.555* 0.318 - 
 
(0.192) (0.332) 
 
(0.285) (0.282) 
 Lagged audited -0.0149 -0.0269 0.000941 0.0208 0.0303 -0.0112 
 
(0.0298) (0.0228) (0.0296) (0.0318) (0.0405) (0.0130) 
Period 2.21e-05 0.00647* 0.00157 0.00339 0.00961*** 0.000177 
 
(0.00177) (0.00366) (0.00149) (0.00268) (0.00346) (0.00188) 
Age 0.00526 0.0225*** 0.00732 -0.0277*** -0.0297** -0.00444 
 
(0.00713) (0.00577) (0.00659) (0.00715) (0.0118) (0.00991) 
Female 0.0893 0.0444 -0.0149 -0.0822 -0.117 -0.000589 
 
(0.0721) (0.0777) (0.0378) (0.0708) (0.0841) (0.0447) 
Europeans 0.0620 0.0501 -0.0730 0.0234 0.0935* -0.0212 
 
(0.0558) (0.0492) (0.0533) (0.0577) (0.0530) (0.0450) 
Constant 0.367* -0.0882 0.290 1.028*** 0.869*** 0.490** 
 
(0.204) (0.169) (0.188) (0.173) (0.327) (0.213) 
Log Likelihood 
      Observations 1,025 1,026 1,026 1,025 1,026 1,026 
R-squared 0.014 0.025 0.034 0.074 0.084 0.015 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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We observe that “ Subjective Probability” (= “Lagged Subjective Probability”) 
has a positive effect on the reporting decisions in No Info and in the Full Info, but 
only significantly in the latter. We also evaluate the effect on the different signals 
received by the subjects in the previous period in the Full Info compared with the 
case of having received no signal (reference). We do not observe a significant 
effect of the signals in the participants’ reporting and compliance decisions. 
However, we do observe that receiving a negative signal or mixed signals in t-1 
has a positive effect on the beliefs about the audit probability compared with the 
case of no signals received in t-1. 
 
Besides, we control by demographic variables and time trend. We observe that the 
proportion of endowment reported, full compliance decisions and the beliefs 
about the subjective audit probability tend to increase over time, but only 
significantly for the full compliance decisions in the No Info and Full Info. 
 
Result 6: Receiving negative and mixed signals (one positive and one negative) 
increase the beliefs about the subjective audit probability in the Full Info, but it 
does not affect significantly the reporting and compliance decisions. 
 
In Table 6, we report the results for the within-estimations for the Positive and 
Negative Info. We introduce lagged variables that capture the effect of the 
different signals received by the subjects in t-1. We observe that receiving two 
positive signals (a strong signal) in the previous round have a positive and 
significant effect on the reporting and full compliance decisions compared with 
the case of receiving No signals in t-1. There is not a significant effect in the 
decisions when one positive signal is received comparing with the case of having 
received no signals in t-1. In column (4) and (5), we notice that one negative 
signal received in the previous round decrease significantly reporting and full 
compliance decisions compared with No signals received in t-1 in the Negative 
Info treatment (in which strong signals are not needed; one is enough). However, 
in column (6) it is shown that the beliefs decrease but not significantly after 
receiving one negative signal compared with no signals received in t-1.  Receiving 
two negative signals has a positive effect but insignificant in the decisions 
compared with no signals received in the previous round. 
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Table 6: specific samples for the Positive and Negative Info - Simultaneous linear regression model 
(2SLS) clustering at group level 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Positive Info Negative Info 
VARIABLES 
Proportion 
Reported  
Full 
Compliance 
Subjective 
probability 
Proportion 
Reported  
Full 
Compliance 
Subjective 
probability 
              
Lagged No Signal Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref 
       Lagged One 
Positive Signal -0.0206 -0.0253 0.0200 
   
 
(0.0429) (0.0383) (0.0186) 
   Lagged Two 
Positive Signals 0.176* 0.255*** 0.0333 
   
 
(0.103) (0.0801) (0.0482) 
   Lagged One 
Negative Signal 
   
-0.0698** -0.0558* -0.00751 
    
(0.0286) (0.0301) (0.0150) 
Lagged Two 
Negative Signals 
   
0.00628 0.0543 0.0142 
    
(0.0656) (0.0547) (0.0432) 
Subjective 
Probability 0.161 -0.00409 
 
0.290 0.0112 
 
 
(0.214) (0.242) 
 
(0.305) (0.321) 
 Lagged audited -0.0851** -0.106*** -0.0387 -0.0429 -0.0293 0.00830 
 
(0.0395) (0.0352) (0.0282) (0.0364) (0.0427) (0.0154) 
Period -0.000578 0.00292 -0.00217** -0.00189 0.00110 -0.00345*** 
 
(0.00122) (0.00254) (0.00105) (0.00277) (0.00318) (0.000807) 
Age -0.00796 -0.00549 -0.00456 0.00739* 0.00898 -0.00489 
 
(0.00525) (0.00708) (0.00556) (0.00423) (0.00623) (0.00323) 
Female -0.000806 -0.0347 0.0245 -0.0498 -0.0357 0.00447 
 
(0.0818) (0.103) (0.0512) (0.0626) (0.0503) (0.0316) 
Europeans 0.176*** 0.0749 -0.0319 0.155** 0.161*** 0.00187 
 
(0.0562) (0.0644) (0.0566) (0.0628) (0.0456) (0.0319) 
Constant 0.669*** 0.567** 0.533*** 0.269 0.0773 0.488*** 
 
(0.181) (0.231) (0.133) (0.197) (0.250) (0.0898) 
       Observations 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026 
R-squared 0.060 0.021 0.019 0.074 0.037 0.019 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We introduce the independent variable “Lagged Audited” to capture the effect of 
past audits in the previous round on the decisions. We find that reporting and full 
compliance decisions decreases when subjects were audited in t-1 in the Positive 
Info treatment. This is consistent with “the bomb crater effect”, which refers to 
the idea that individuals might perceive the risk of being audited to fall 
immediately after an audit (see Guala and Mittone, 2005; Mittone, 2006). 
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We also control for demographic variables and time trend. We observe that 
reporting and compliance decisions do not vary significantly over time, but the 
beliefs about the subjective probability of being audit tend to decrease 
significantly in the Positive Info and Negative info. Europeans participants tend to 
report more in both Positive and Negative Info. We also control for the beliefs 
about the audit probability and notice that beliefs have not a significant effect in 
reporting and compliance decisions in the Positive and Negative Info treatments. 
This result suggests that subjects’ beliefs do not significantly affect compliance 
and reporting decisions in the Positive and Negative Info treatment. 
 
Result 7: Receiving strong (by being two) positive signals affect positively 
reporting and full compliance decisions compared with receiving No signals in 
the Positive Info. Past audits affects negatively the reporting and compliance 
decisions only in the Positive Info. In the Negative Info, subjects also tend to 
report and comply less after receiving non-strong (only one) negative signal than 
no signals in the previous round. Negative and positive signals received in the 
Negative and Positive Info respectively do not have a significant effect on beliefs 
compared with no signals received in the previous round. 
 
As a robustness check, table 7 displays the determinants of the proportion of 
endowment reported within-treatment for the No Info, Full Info, Positive Info and 
Negative Info. The models are estimated by implementing simultaneous Tobit 
models in order to address the simultaneity between the subjective probability 
stated by the subjects and their reporting decisions. We estimate simultaneous 
two-limit Tobit models in column 1 to 4 and simultaneous upper-limit Tobit 
models in column 5 to 8.  We observe that the results in Table 7 are consistent 
with Result 7. In the Positive Info, receiving strong (by being two) positive 
signals have a positive and significant effect in the reporting decisions compared 
with no signals received in t-1 (in both Column 3 and 7). Instead, receiving non-
strong (by being only one) negative signals in the Negative Info have a negative 
and significant effect compared with no signals received in the previous round (in 
both Column 4 and 8). Instead, we do not observe a significant effect of any 
signal compared with no signal received in the Full Info.  
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We control for past audit (“Lagged audited”) and, consistent with Result 7, it has 
only a significant effect in the Positive Info. In fact, subjects tend to report less 
after being audited 
Table 7: Simultaneous two limits and upper limit Tobit cluster at group level for the proportion of endowment 
reported by treatment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
TWO LIMITS UPPER LIMIT 
VARIABLE
S Proportion Reported Proportion Reported 
 
No  
Info 
Full  
Info 
Positive 
Info 
Negative 
Info 
No  
Info 
Full  
Info 
Positive 
Info 
Negative 
Info 
Lagged No 
signal Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref 
         
Lagged 
Positive 
Signal 
 
0.0619 -0.0626   
 
0.0495 -0.0418 
 
  
(0.0807) (0.121)   
 
(0.0642) (0.0763) 
 Lagged Two 
Positive 
Signal 
 
0.223 0.634*   
 
0.140 0.441* 
 
  
(0.321) (0.379)   
 
(0.271) (0.230) 
 Lagged 
Negative 
Signal 
 
-0.0298 
 
-0.146** 
 
-0.00912 
 
-0.0973* 
  
(0.102) 
 
(0.0668) 
 
(0.0718) 
 
(0.0501) 
Lagged Two 
Negative 
Signal 
 
0.00383 
 
0.0169 
 
-0.00442 
 
0.0227 
  
(0.121) 
 
(0.139) 
 
(0.0864) 
 
(0.101) 
Lagged Two 
Mixed 
Signal 
 
0.235 
 
  
 
0.175 
  
  
(0.242) 
 
  
 
(0.195) 
  Subjective 
Probability 0.226 1.151 0.447 0.310 0.0920 0.804 0.171 0.337 
 
(0.575) (0.812) (0.640) (0.665) (0.457) (0.544) (0.409) (0.485) 
Lagged 
Audited -0.0445 0.0641 -0.262** -0.0853 -0.0358 0.0390 -0.164** -0.0606 
 
(0.0816) (0.0853) (0.120) (0.0800) (0.0500) (0.0699) (0.0710) (0.0569) 
Period 0.00348 0.0104 0.000600 -0.00282 0.00406 0.0103* 0.00127 -0.00133 
 
(0.00650
) (0.00777) (0.00495) (0.00490) (0.00467) (0.00591) (0.00294) (0.00416) 
Age 0.0314 -0.0697*** -0.0188 0.0198 0.0230* -0.0512*** -0.0115 0.0154 
 
(0.0201) (0.0242) (0.0166) (0.0160) (0.0133) (0.0159) (0.00970) (0.0122) 
Female 0.231 -0.198 -0.0223 -0.0550 0.134 -0.186 -0.0232 -0.0710 
 
(0.183) (0.190) (0.250) (0.119) (0.140) (0.148) (0.172) (0.0825) 
Europeans 0.177 0.111 0.412*** 0.296*** 0.108 0.0724 0.251*** 0.249*** 
 
(0.141) (0.123) (0.151) (0.0888) (0.0932) (0.0926) (0.0937) (0.0609) 
Constant -0.155 1.868*** 0.968* 0.0527 0.158 1.619*** 0.960** 0.172 
 
(0.525) (0.593) (0.521) (0.455) (0.346) (0.433) (0.385) (0.337) 
    
  
    Observations 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026 
Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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We also control for the stated subjective probability, demographic characteristics 
of the subjects and time trend. We do not observe a significant increase of the 
reporting decisions over time. The stated subjective probability also does not have 
an effect in the reporting decisions. Europeans participants tend to report 
significantly more than non-Europeans in the Positive and Negative Info.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
We implement a controlled laboratory experiment to investigate the effect of 
social information has an effect on the level of individual compliance in a fixed-
six-nodes circle network, particularly when the information is positive (compliant 
behaviour) and negative (un-compliant behaviour). Few attempts have been made 
to document an impact of social interactions on tax compliance using 
experimental data. What little evidence exists is rather inconclusive (see Fortin et 
al., 2007; Lefebvre et al., 2014). We analyse whether individuals have the same 
attitude towards tax evasion by introducing four information conditions: No Info, 
Full Info, Positive Info and Negative Info.  
In the No info treatment, individuals get individual information about whether 
they were audited, the outcome of it and her final payoff. In the Positive Info 
(Negative Info) treatment, participants get information whether the nodes they are 
connected with were audited and found compliant (noncompliant). We run a 
second control treatment (Full Info) in which participants get both positive and 
negative signals.  
This tax game has four interesting features: First, and following Fortin et al. 
(2007), individual monetary payoffs do not depend on the other participants’ 
behavior. This allows us to isolate better the effect of social information in the 
network. Second, we specifically control for the effect of signals on participants’ 
beliefs on the ex-ante fixed and unknown probability of being audited by asking 
them to use an incentive compatible mechanism. Third, we keep the tax rate and 
fine rate fixed and known by the subjects. Four, subjects earn their endowment in 
each round in a real effort task. 
Our results suggest that positive signals (good examples) and negative signals 
(bad examples) have a significant impact on the reporting and full compliance 
decisions at individual level. However, we find mixed results at aggregate level.  
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In the Negative Info, average compliance and the average stated subjective audit 
probability are significantly lower in comparison with the No Info treatment. This 
suggests that subjects comply significantly less because their beliefs about the 
audit probability are significantly lower in the Negative Info than in the No Info. 
In fact, beliefs of the subjective audit probability decreases significantly over time 
in the Negative Info, while it does not vary in the No Info, Full Info and Positive 
Info treatments. Conversely, strong (for being two) positive signals about 
neighbors’ compliance behavior do encourage a higher compliance in the Positive 
Info and in the Full Info compared with the No Info treatment.  
 
In the Negative Info, subjects tend to comply significantly less after receiving 
non-strong (only one) negative signals from the linked neighbors in comparison 
with no signals received in the previous round. This result suggests that non-
strong negative signals cause a contagious effect on individuals’ behavior. The 
fact that participants tend to comply less after receiving bad examples is in line 
with previous experimental literature, which find evidence of the “broken window 
effect” (Fortin et al., 2007; Innes and Mitra, 2013; Lefevbre et al., 2014).  
 
Positive signals in the Positive Info treatment, even though significantly less 
frequent than negative signals in the Negative Info, have a positive and significant 
effect on full compliance and reporting decisions in comparison with no signals 
received in the previous round. This result suggests that good examples have a 
disciplinary effect on subjects’ decisions.  
 
Overall, our experimental study offers a precious insight on the role of positive 
and negative signals (good and bad examples, respectively) on individuals’ tax 
compliance decisions. In fact, social information has an important effect on tax 
compliance when people are interconnected nodes in a network because they tend 
to value more the behavior of others they know better (Lefebvre et al., 2014). In 
this context seems relevant to consider how diffusion of social information 
regarding others’ tax compliance behavior across social networks could impact 
individuals’ decisions on tax compliance. Our results suggest that allowing for 
diffusion of good examples may have a disciplinary effect on tax compliance 
decisions and so, it could be a good way to improve tax compliance while, 
diffusion of bad examples seems to have a deteriorating effect on individuals’ tax 
compliance decisions within networks.  
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Instructions 
 
This is an experiment to study decision-making. The instructions are simple and if you 
follow them carefully you will get an amount of money in cash at the end of the 
experiment in a confidential manner. All through the experiment you will be treated 
anonymously. Neither the experimenters nor the people in this room will ever know your 
particular choices or the amount of money that you get. Talking is forbidden during the 
experiment. You cannot use your mobile phones while in the laboratory. If you have any 
questions, raise your hand and remain silent. You will be attended to as soon as possible. 
 
This experiment consists of two different blocks. We will explain now the instructions of 
Block 1 and at the end of this block you will receive the instructions of Block 2. 
 
 
First Block 
 
All participants face a simple task. The task consists of adding two-digit numbers for 3 
minutes. We will call this task the adding task. The more correct answers you get, the 
more earnings you make in this block, as each correct answer is paid £0.05. Errors do not 
count. 
Once the task is completed, you will get information about your performance (the number 
of correct answers and your earnings). You will not get information about the 
performance of the other participants. 
 
 
 
Second block 
 
The second block has a total of 20 rounds. At the beginning of the experiment, you will 
be randomly assigned to a group of six participants. The composition of each group will 
not change, but you will never know the identity of the other participants in your group. 
 
 
 
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be randomly assigned to one of the two 
following roles: A and B. Your roles will not change along the experiment, so you will be 
A or B during the 20 rounds. There will be twice as many A than B participants, so the 
probability of becoming A (B) is 2/3 (1/3).  You will know your role as soon as the 
second block starts. 
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Each round you will make decisions in independent teams of three people: two A and one 
B. At the end of each round teams will be reshuffled within groups. That is, you may or 
may not be playing with the same participants in the next round. As the number of rounds 
(20) exceeds the number of group members (6), you know for sure you will be repeatedly 
interacting with the other participants in your group, even when the probability of making 
decisions with the same participants in two consecutive rounds is very low.  
 
Participants A and B will make different decisions in this block, so we will present them 
one after the other. 
 
 
 
Participants A 
 
As a participant A, you would make three different types of decisions per round, in three 
stages: 
 
Stage 1: Adding task 
You would face again the adding task at the beginning of each round. You would add 
two-digit numbers for 1 minute. Your individual round endowment will be determined by 
your individual performance, as your endowment will be the number of correct answers 
multiplied by 2 with a maximum of 10 ECU (Experimental Currency Units). Getting 
more than 5 correct answers does not give you additional endowment. At the end of the 
minute, you will get information about your performance and your endowment; you will 
get no information about the performance of others. 
 
Stage 2: Rolling a die 
Once you get your endowment, you will roll a virtual die of six faces. All numbers from 1 
to 6 share the same probability of being selected by the computer. The number you get 
gives you a rule to follow in your next decision. 
 
Stage 3: Sending 
Each number is associated with one specific rule about the proportion of your endowment 
to send to the participant B you are matched with in that particular round. The table 
below shows the amount to send associated to each number: 
 
Outcome of the die: 1 2 3 4 5 6 
% of endowment you keep 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 
% of endowment you send 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
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Note that the rule is not binding. In other words, you may or may not follow the rule (and 
send a different proportion of your endowment to B). You will be the only participant 
knowing the outcome of the die. 
Your outcome will be determined by your decision and B’s decision. We will multiply by 
4 any amount you send to B. For instance, if you send 10 ECU, he will get 40. If you 
send 8, he will get 32, and so on.  The following figure represents the decisions made by 
both participants A sending two amounts (x, y) to B, being both amounts multiplied by 4.  
 
B’s decisions are explained below. 
 
 
 
Participants B 
 
As a participant B, you would make two different types of decisions per round, in two 
stages: 
 
Stage 1: Rolling two dice 
After you get information about the amount sent by the participants A you are matched 
with in that particular round, you roll a virtual die of six faces twice. All numbers from 1 
to 6 share the same probability of being selected by the computer. The numbers give you 
again a rule to follow in your next decision. 
 
Stage 2: Sending 
Each number is associated with a specific rule about how much to send back to each A in 
that particular round. The table below links each outcome of the die with a proportion to 
keep and to send back to each A: 
 
Outcome of the die: 1 2 3 4 5 6 
% you keep 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 
% you send back to A 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
 
 
Note that the rule is not binding. In other words, you may or may not follow the rule (and 
send a different proportion to each A). You will be the only participant knowing the 
outcome of each die. 
You will get information about the amounts sent by each A in one screen. For simplicity, 
you will make a decision about how much to send back to each A in separated screens. 
So, you will first be reminded about the amount sent by the first participant A you are 
matched with (let’s call him A1), multiplied by four. You will roll the first virtual die and 
make a decision about how much to send to A1. Then you will be reminded about the 
amount sent by A2, multiplied by 4, and you will throw a second die and make a second 
decision. Both decisions may or may not be the same. The following figure shows the 
decisions of B. 
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Participants A will never know the outcome of each die. They will only be informed 
about the amount sent back to each of them.  
 
 
 
 
Earnings and some examples 
 
At the end of the experiment, we will randomly select one of the rounds to compute your 
earnings. As all round shave the same probability of being selected, you should pay 
attention to every decision you make. 
Participants A will be paid depending on their interactions with the participant B in that 
round, following the logic explained above. Participants B will be paid by ONE of the 
interactions with ONE participant A, plus a fixed amount of 5 ECU. 
Imagine that round 17 is randomly selected to compute payoffs. Then, both A1 and A2 
will be paid the amount of ECU they get back from B, using the exchange rate of 1 ECU= 
£0.40.  
To compute the earnings of participant B, one of the two interactions is also randomly 
selected. Imagine that the interaction with participant A2 in that round 17 is randomly 
chosen. Then, participant B earns the amount he keeps in that interaction (that is, what he 
gets from A2 multiplied by 4 minus what he sends back), plus the fixed amount of 5 
ECU. The total amount of ECU is then exchanged to £ using the same rate (1 ECU= 
£0.40). 
 
Let us show you some examples of how earnings are computed in some polar cases. For 
simplicity, we will assume that both players will make similar decisions in all rounds, and 
they will be paid  by one of this rounds at random. 
 
Case 1 
Participants A always get an endowment of 10 ECU. 
 
Participants A never follow the rule suggested by the die, and decide to send nothing to 
B. 
 
Participant B in this case does nothing, as there is nothing to decide about. 
 
Participants A will be paid at the end of the experiment 10 ECU (the amount they keep) 
and participant B gets 5 ECU, or £2.50 and £1.25, respectively (plus their earnings in the 
first block of the experiment). 
 
Case 2 
Participants A always get an endowment of 10 ECU. 
 
Participants A always follow the rule suggested by the die. They will be sending 0, 2, 4, 
6, 8 or 10 ECU depending on the number they get back from the die. As the outcome of 
the die is absolutely random, both A will be sending each amount one sixth of the times, 
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as all the amounts are equally likely. On average each A will be sending 5 ECU (the 
average of 0, 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10), and B will be getting on average 20 ECU. 
 
Participant B never follows the rule suggested by the die, and decides to send nothing 
back to participants A. 
 
Participants A will be paid at the end of the experiment 5 ECU on average, as they sent 
half of their initial endowment. Participant B will get on average 20 ECU, or £5. 
 
 
Case 3 
Participants A always get an endowment of 10 ECU. 
 
Participants A always follow the rule suggested by the die. They will be sending 0, 2, 4, 
6, 8 or 10 ECU depending on the number they get back from the die. As the outcome of 
the die is absolutely random, both A will be sending each amount one sixth of the times, 
as all the amounts are equally likely. On average each A will be sending 5 ECU (the 
average of 0, 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10), and B will be getting on average 20 ECU. 
 
Participant B always follows the rule suggested by the die, and decides to send back to 
participants A 0%, or 20%, or 40%, and so on. Again, the outcome of the die is random in 
the sense that all amounts are equally likely. So, in average, he will send back the average 
of 0-20-40-60-80-100%, which is 50%. As he gets (on average) 20 ECU, he will send 
back (on average) 10 ECU. 
 
Participants A will be paid at the end of the experiment 15 ECU, as they sent 5 ECU and 
get 10 ECU back from B. Participant B will also get on average 15 ECU, because he has 
5 ECU as a fixed payoff, and keeps half of the amount he gets (another 10 ECU). 
 
 
Case 4 
Participants A always get and endowment of 10 ECU. 
 
Participants A never follow the rule suggested by the die, but decide to send more than 
the outcome of it. They will send 2, 4, 6, 8 or 10 ECU. On average each A will be 
sending 6 ECU (the average of 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10), and B will be getting on average 24 
ECU. 
 
Participant B never follows the rule suggested by the die, and decides to send back to 
participants A more than the die says, 20%, or 40%, and so on. So, in average, he will 
send back the average of 20-40-60-80-100%, which is 60%. As he gets (on average) 24 
ECU, he will send back (on average) 14.4 ECU. 
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Appendix 1 
 
1. Comparison between studies (Chapter 1 and 2): random assignment to roles vs. 
allocation of roles by merit 
 
In this appendix, we want to compare the results obtained in the Chapter 1 (Borzino et al., 
2015) and Chapter 2. As shown in table 1 below, we implement different selection 
mechanism of the fixed roles in the two studies. In Chapter 1, a random allocation of the 
roles (sender and receiver) is implemented. In Chapter 2, we manipulate the social status 
by assigning the roles according to the performance of the players in a preliminary stage: 
best performers become high status receivers and, bottom performers become low status 
senders. By comparing the two experiments, we study the effect of social status on trust, 
trustworthiness and compliance in each information conditions. 
 Table	1:	Experimental	dimensions	of	Chapter	1	(Borzino	et	al.,	2015)	and	Chapter	2	
   Information Treatments 
Selection 
Mechanism 
of Roles 
Random 
(Borzino et al., 
2015) 
Baseline 
(6 indep. 
observations) 
Reputation 
(6 indep. 
observations) 
Transparency 
(6 indep. 
observations) 
Merit 
(Chapter 2) 
 
Baseline 
Merit 
(6 indep. 
observations) 
 
Reputation     
Merit 
(6 indep, 
observations) 
Transparency Merit	(7	indep.	observations)	
 
In table 2, we present the descriptive statistics of both studies with and without social 
status. The first column illustrates the average proportion sent, including the cases in 
which senders exhibited no trust. We do not observe significant differences when we 
compare the average proportion sent by the senders between the bundles of the two 
baselines, the two reputation and the two transparency treatments. In the second column, 
we consider only the cases in which positive amounts were sent to the receivers. Again, 
we do not find any significant difference.			 	
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		Table	2:	descriptive	statistics	across	experiments-	TRUST	and	TRUSTWORTHINESS	
    
Trust 
(Proportion X sent by senders) 
Trustworthiness 
(Proportion Y return by receivers) 
    
Amount 
Sent 
Amount 
Sent 
Proportion 
of X=0 
Amount 
Return 
Amount 
Return 
Proportion 
of Y=0 
(Including 
X=0) 
(X>0  
only) 
(Including 
X=0) 
(X>0 
only) 
(X>0  
only) 
Total 
 
0.334 0.5313 37.12% 0.225 0.303 29.74% 
 
 
   (0.1008) (0.1119)  (0.0099) (0.0131)  
       
Baseline 
 
0.3795 0.505 24.84% 0.2833 0.3767 24.10% 
 
 
(0.3213) (0.2707)  (0.3156) (0.3118) 
 
 
Baseline 
Merit       0.2887 0.5633 49.38%* 0.1675* 0.23* 35.38%* 
  
(0.34680 (0.2904)  (0.2899) (0.3424)  
Total 
 
0.3606 0.5076 28.96% 0.2179 0.267 25.77% 
  
(0.0106) (0.0107)  (0.0083) (0.0098)         
Reputation 
 
0.3454 0.4848 28.75% 0.2288 0.3211 25.44% 
 
 
(0.3165) (0.272)  (0.2697) (0.2692)  
       
Reputation   
Merit 
     0.3758 0.5703 29.17% 0.207 0.2123 26.10% 
  
(0.3432) (0.2771)  (0.2452) (0.2543)  
Total 
 
0.4342 0.5609 22.60% 0.243 0.283 25.09% 
 
 
(0.0106) (0.1007)  (0.0081) (0.0091)  
       
Transparency 0.4388 0.5345 17.92% 0.2433 0.2964 25.38% 
 
 
(0.3206) (0.272)  (0.2697) (0.2596)  
       
Transparency 
Merit 0.4303 0.5863 26.61% 0.2435 0.269 24.82% 
   (0.363) (0.2966)  (0.2666) (0.2703)  
Notes: Standard deviations are displayed in parentheses; Stars report significance level from 
Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney tests run on independent observations (cohorts of 6 participants) to 
confirm differences with the baseline treatment.  
*90% significance ** 95% significance *** 99% significance 
 
 
In the third column, we present the proportion of no trust displayed by senders. In 
this case, we found a marginally significant difference when we compare the 
baseline with the baseline merit treatment (p=0.0782). The proportion of nothing 
sent in the baseline merit treatment by the low status senders almost doubled the 
one in the baseline treatment. In fact, in the baseline merit, low status senders play 
the Nash equilibrium 49,38% of the times compared with the 24.84% in the 
baseline treatment. 
The right part of table 2 shows the results for trustworthiness. Trustworthiness is 
marginally higher in the baseline compared with the baseline merit treatment 
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(p=0.0782). However, when we compare the reputation (transparency) with the 
reputation merit (transparency merit) treatments, no significant difference are 
found.  
In the second column, we only consider the return decisions when the amount sent 
was positive (X>0). Receivers send very marginally less in the baseline merit 
condition compared with receivers in the baseline treatment (p=0.1020). No 
differences were found when we compare reputation with reputation merit and 
transparency with transparency merit.  
In the third column, we display the average proportion of no return (no 
trustworthiness) when the amount received was positive (X>0). Receivers return 
positive amounts fewer times in the baseline merit than the receivers in the 
baseline (p=0.0921). The difference between the reputation and reputation merit 
treatment as well as the difference between the transparency and transparency 
merit treatments are not significant. 
 
Result 1: Trustworthiness is lower in the baseline merit compared with the 
baseline, in which no manipulation of social status is implemented. Senders play 
more often the Nash equilibrium in the baseline merit compared with senders in 
the baseline treatment.  
 
1.1. Econometric Analysis 
 
1.1.1- Trust 
 
Table 3 reports the econometric regressions for trust. We control for past 
decisions (proportion sent) as well as for the outcome of the die, period and 
demographic variables. The variable Lag Proportion Sent corresponds to the 
decision of the senders in the previous round. We find no significant affect of 
merit in any of the conditions.  
However, we find a gender effect when we compare the baseline merit with the 
baseline condition and, when we compare the transparency and the transparency 
merit treatments. Female senders tend to send significantly less in the baseline 
merit compared with the female senders in the baseline. Furthermore, low status 
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female senders tend to send significantly less in the transparency merit compared 
with the female senders in the transparency. 
 
Result 2: Low status female senders tend to send less in the baseline merit and in 
the transparency merit compared with female senders in the baseline merit and in 
the transparency merit treatments, respectively. 
 
Table 3: Random effects ordered probit for Trust- pooled samples 
 Proportion sent by the sender (Xit) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Baseline 
 vs  
Baseline Merit 
Reputation 
 vs  
Reputation Merit 
Transparency  
vs  
Transparency Merit 
        
Outcome of die (Rule) 0.1121*** 0.1362*** 0.2006*** 
 
(0.0356) (0.0256) (0.0431) 
Period -0.0217** -0.01944 -0.0120** 
 
(0.011) (0.0142) (0.0036) 
Baseline treatment Ref - - 
Baseline merit treatment -0.6299 - - 
 
(0.4378) 
  Reputation treatment - Ref - 
Reputation merit treatment - 0.0986 - 
  
(0.3198) 
 Transparency treatment - - Ref 
Transparency merit treatment - - -0.225 
   
(0.2495) 
Female -0.4983** 0.143 -0.5261** 
 
(0.2515) (0.333) (0.2166) 
Age 0.0462 0.0221 0.0386*** 
 
(0.0810) (0.0849) (0.0123) 
British -0.2847 -0.128 0.0777 
 
(0.3852) (0.4104) (0.2587) 
Log-Pseudo likelihood -1340.3845 -1440.8406 -1647.2247 
Observations 960 960 1040 
Number of indiv 48 48 52 
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1 
1.1.2. Trustworthiness 
 
In table 4, we report the regressions on trustworthiness considering only the cases 
of positive trust.  We control for past decisions, outcome of the die and 
demographics. We find that the receivers tend to return significantly less in the 
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baseline merit compared with the receivers in the baseline (p=0.039). This finding 
is consistent with table 2 and Result 1. 
In the second column, we display the regression comparing the trustworthiness of 
receivers in the reputation merit with the one of receivers in the reputation 
treatment, which is our reference. We do not find any significant difference. 
In the third column, we present the econometric results and again no significant 
difference when we compare the level of trustworthiness in the transparency merit 
treatment with the transparency treatment. 
 
Table 4: Random effects ordered probit for Trustworthiness- pooled samples 
 Proportion returned by Receivers (Yit) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Baseline  
vs  
Baseline Merit 
Reputation  
vs  
Reputation Merit 
Transparency  
vs  
Transparency Merit 
        
Outcome of the Die (Rule) -0.109 0.0144 -0.0303*** 
 
(0.0224) (0.0145) (0.0227) 
Baseline treatment Ref - - 
Baseline merit treatment -0.6948** - - 
 
(0.489) 
  Reputation treatment - Ref - 
Reputation merit treatment - 0.126 - 
  
(0.4022) 
 Transparency treatment - - Ref 
Transparency merit treatment - - -0.209 
   
(0.3590) 
Period -0.0261*** -0.0280** -0.0214 
 
(0.00594) (0.025) (0.0089) 
Age 0.0257 0.0800 0.135** 
 
(0.0247) (0.148) (0.0571) 
British -0.0939 -0.0865 0.194 
 
(0.6014) (0.4645) (0.413) 
Female 0.0962 0.3192 -0.5081** 
 
(0.3086) (0.4009) (0.2466) 
Log Pseudo Likelihood -1171.9163 -1222.4644 -1440.467 
Observations 960 960 1040 
Number of indiv 24 24 26 
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
	
	
2. Conclusion 
We compare the results obtained in Chapter 1 (Borzino et al, 2015) with the 
results from the current study. This means that we compare three treatments 
(baseline, reputation and transparency), in which the roles are assigned randomly, 
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with the three treatments in the current study (baseline merit, reputation merit and 
transparency merit), in which we give to the subjects the same information and we 
manipulate the social status of the players. Our findings suggest that the 
introduction of social information has a positive impact on the level of trust in 
networks with no differences in social status and in networks characterized by 
differences in social status.	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 
 
 
 
Instructions 
 
This is an experiment to study decision-making. The instructions are simple and if you 
follow them carefully you will get an amount of money in cash at the end of the 
experiment in a confidential manner. All through the experiment you will be treated 
anonymously. Neither the experimenters nor the people in this room will ever know your 
particular choices or the amount of money that you get. Talking is forbidden during the 
experiment. You cannot use your mobile phones while in the laboratory. If you have any 
questions, raise your hand and remain silent. You will be attended to as soon as possible. 
 
This experiment consists of two different blocks. We will explain now the instructions of 
Block 1 and at the end of this block you will receive the instructions of Block 2. 
 
 
First Block 
 
All participants face a simple task. The task consists of adding two-digit numbers for 3 
minutes. We will call this task the adding task. The more correct answers you get, the 
more earnings you make in this block, as each correct answer is paid £0.05. Errors do not 
count. 
Once the task is completed, you will get information about your performance (the number 
of correct answers and your earnings). The number of correct answers that you get at this 
stage, will determine your role in the game. The players with more correct answers will 
get the role of B and the players with less correct answers will get the role of A. You will 
keep the same role for the entire experiment. 
 
 
 
Second block 
 
The second block has a total of 20 rounds. At the beginning of the experiment, you will 
be assigned one of the two roles ( A or B) depending on your performance in the trial 
phase. The players with more correct answers will be get the role of B (top performers) 
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and the players with less correct answers will get the role of A (bottom performers). You 
will be part of a group of six participants. The composition of each group will not change, 
but you will never know the identity of the other participants in your group. 
 
 
 
Your roles will not change along the experiment, so you will be A or B during the 20 
rounds. There will be twice as many A than B participants.  You will know your role as 
soon as the second block starts. 
 
 
 
Each round you will make decisions in independent teams of three people: two A and one 
B. At the end of each round teams will be reshuffled within groups. That is, you may or 
may not be playing with the same participants in the next round. As the number of rounds 
(20) exceeds the number of group members (6), you know for sure you will be repeatedly 
interacting with the other participants in your group, even when the probability of making 
decisions with the same participants in two consecutive rounds is very low.  
 
Participants A and B will make different decisions in this block, so we will present them 
one after the other. 
 
 
Participants A 
As a participant A, you would make three different types of decisions per round, in three 
stages: 
 
Stage 1: Adding task 
You would face again the adding task at the beginning of each round. You would add 
two-digit numbers for 1 minute. Your individual round endowment will be determined by 
your individual performance, as your endowment will be the number of correct answers 
multiplied by 2 with a maximum of 10 ECU (Experimental Currency Units). Getting 
more than 5 correct answers does not give you additional endowment. At the end of the 
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minute, you will get information about your performance and your endowment; you will 
get no information about the performance of others. 
 
 
 
Stage 2: Rolling a die 
Once you get your endowment, you will roll a virtual die of six faces. All numbers from 1 
to 6 share the same probability of being selected by the computer. The number you get 
gives you a rule to follow in your next decision. 
 
Stage 3: Sending 
Each number is associated with one specific rule about the proportion of your endowment 
to send to the participant B you are matched with in that particular round. The table 
below shows the amount to send associated to each number: 
 
Outcome of the die: 1 2 3 4 5 6 
% of endowment you keep 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 
% of endowment you send 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
 
 
 
 
Note that the rule is not binding. In other words, you may or may not follow the rule (and 
send a different proportion of your endowment to B). You will be the only participant 
knowing the outcome of the die. 
Your outcome will be determined by your decision and B’s decision. We will multiply by 
4 any amount you send to B. For instance, if you send 10 ECU, he will get 40. If you 
send 8, he will get 32, and so on.  The following figure represents the decisions made by 
both participants A sending two amounts (x, y) to B, being both amounts multiplied by 4.  
 
 
B’s decisions are explained below. 
 
Participants B 
 
As a participant B, you would make two different types of decisions per round, in two 
stages: 
 
Stage 1: Rolling two dice 
After you get information about the amount sent by the participants A you are matched 
with in that particular round, you roll a virtual die of six faces twice. All numbers from 1 
to 6 share the same probability of being selected by the computer. The numbers give you 
again a rule to follow in your next decision. 
 
Stage 2: Sending 
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Each number is associated with a specific rule about how much to send back to each A in 
that particular round. The table below links each outcome of the die with a proportion to 
keep and to send back to each A: 
 
 
 
 
 
Outcome of the die: 1 2 3 4 5 6 
% you keep 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 
% you send back to A 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
 
 
 
Note that the rule is not binding. In other words, you may or may not follow the rule (and 
send a different proportion to each A). You will be the only participant knowing the 
outcome of each die. 
You will get information about the amounts sent by each A in one screen. For simplicity, 
you will make a decision about how much to send back to each A in separated screens. 
So, you will first be reminded about the amount sent by the first participant A you are 
matched with (let’s call him A1), multiplied by four. You will roll the first virtual die and 
make a decision about how much to send to A1. Then you will be reminded about the 
amount sent by A2, multiplied by 4, and you will throw a second die and make a second 
decision. Both decisions may or may not be the same. The following figure shows the 
decisions of B. 
 
 
Participants A will never know the outcome of each die. They will only be informed 
about the amount sent back to each of them.  
 
 
 
 
Earnings and some examples 
 
At the end of the experiment, we will randomly select one of the rounds to compute your 
earnings. As all round shave the same probability of being selected, you should pay 
attention to every decision you make. 
Participants A will be paid depending on their interactions with the participant B in that 
round, following the logic explained above. Participants B will be paid by ONE of the 
interactions with ONE participant A, plus a fixed amount of 5 ECU. 
Imagine that round 17 is randomly selected to compute payoffs. Then, both A1 and A2 
will be paid the amount of ECU they get back from B, using the exchange rate of 1 ECU= 
£0.40.  
To compute the earnings of participant B, one of the two interactions is also randomly 
selected. Imagine that the interaction with participant A2 in that round 17 is randomly 
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chosen. Then, participant B earns the amount he keeps in that interaction (that is, what he 
gets from A2 multiplied by 4 minus what he sends back), plus the fixed amount of 5 
ECU. The total amount of ECU is then exchanged to £ using the same rate (1 ECU= 
£0.40). 
 
Let us show you some examples of how earnings are computed in some polar cases. For 
simplicity, we will assume that both players will make similar decisions in all rounds, and 
they will be paid by one of this rounds at random. 
 
Case 1 
Participants A always get an endowment of 10 ECU. 
 
Participants A never follow the rule suggested by the die, and decide to send nothing to 
B. 
 
Participant B in this case does nothing, as there is nothing to decide about. 
 
Participants A will be paid at the end of the experiment 10 ECU (the amount they keep) 
and participant B gets 5 ECU, or £2.50 and £1.25, respectively (plus their earnings in the 
first block of the experiment). 
 
Case 2 
Participants A always get an endowment of 10 ECU. 
 
Participants A always follow the rule suggested by the die. They will be sending 0, 2, 4, 
6, 8 or 10 ECU depending on the number they get back from the die. As the outcome of 
the die is absolutely random, both A will be sending each amount one sixth of the times, 
as all the amounts are equally likely. On average each A will be sending 5 ECU (the 
average of 0, 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10), and B will be getting on average 20 ECU. 
 
Participant B never follows the rule suggested by the die, and decides to send nothing 
back to participants A. 
 
Participants A will be paid at the end of the experiment 5 ECU on average, as they sent 
half of their initial endowment. Participant B will get on average 20 ECU, or £5. 
 
 
 
Case 3 
Participants A always get an endowment of 10 ECU. 
 
Participants A always follow the rule suggested by the die. They will be sending 0, 2, 4, 
6, 8 or 10 ECU depending on the number they get back from the die. As the outcome of 
the die is absolutely random, both A will be sending each amount one sixth of the times, 
as all the amounts are equally likely. On average each A will be sending 5 ECU (the 
average of 0, 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10), and B will be getting on average 20 ECU. 
 
Participant B always follows the rule suggested by the die, and decides to send back to 
participants A 0%, or 20%, or 40%, and so on. Again, the outcome of the die is random in 
the sense that all amounts are equally likely. So, in average, he will send back the average 
of 0-20-40-60-80-100%, which is 50%. As he gets (on average) 20 ECU, he will send 
back (on average) 10 ECU. 
 
Participants A will be paid at the end of the experiment 15 ECU, as they sent 5 ECU and 
get 10 ECU back from B. Participant B will also get on average 15 ECU, because he has 
5 ECU as a fixed payoff, and keeps half of the amount he gets (another 10 ECU). 
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Case 4 
Participants A always get and endowment of 10 ECU. 
 
Participants A never follow the rule suggested by the die, but decide to send more than 
the outcome of it. They will send 2, 4, 6, 8 or 10 ECU. On average each A will be 
sending 6 ECU (the average of 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10), and B will be getting on average 24 
ECU. 
 
Participant B never follows the rule suggested by the die, and decides to send back to 
participants A more than the die says, 20%, or 40%, and so on. So, in average, he will 
send back the average of 20-40-60-80-100%, which is 60%. As he gets (on average) 24 
ECU, he will send back (on average) 14.4 ECU. 
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Instructions 	
Welcome to our experiment! This is an experiment about decision-making. The 
instructions are simple. If you follow them carefully, you can earn more money 
depending on your own decisions. These instructions and your decisions in this 
experiment are solely your private information. During the experiment you are not 
allowed to communicate with any of the other participants or with anyone outside the 
laboratory. Please switch off your mobile phone now. If you have any questions at any 
time during the course of this experiment, please raise your hand. An experimenter will 
assist you privately. 
This experiment consists of twenty (20) consecutive decision rounds. Each decision 
round consists of two stages described below. Your payoff in this experiment will be in 
Experimental Currency Units (ECU). Once the experiment is over, the computer will 
randomly select one round, which will be used for payments. That means you will be paid 
for one (randomly chosen) round out of the 20 rounds.  The payoff from the selected 
round will be converted to pounds at the following rate:   
75 ECUS = £1 
Your decisions will be recorded privately at your computer terminal. You will be paid 
individually and privately in cash at the end of the experiment.  
At the beginning of the experiment, participants will be randomly divided into 
groups of six (6) individuals. The composition of the groups will remain the same in 
each round. This means that you will interact with the same people in your group 
throughout the experiment. Each player will be given an identifying letter: A,B,C,D, E 
and D. You will see your ID on your screen.  As you can see from figure below, each 
group member will be connected to two group members. For example, if your identifying 
letter is A, you will be connected to players B and F. Individuals in your group will NOT 
be identified in any way. Thus, information about individual results will be completely 
anonymous. 
 
 
 
STAGE 1 OF EACH ROUND 
 
In Stage 1 of each round, you will have the opportunity to make money (ECUs) by 
performing a task, which will last 60 seconds.  
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The task consists of adding two-digit numbers. For each correct answer, you will receive 
2 ECU. The maximum amount of ECU you could earn each round is 10 ECU. Once you 
have finished your task, you will be informed about how many ECU you have earned. At 
the same time, the computer will randomly select one factor out of the following three: 
50, 100 or 150. Your earnings from Stage 1 consist of total ECUS from the adding task 
multiplied by the randomly selected factor.  
Your earnings in Stage 1 = (ECU from adding task)*(selected factor) 
At the end of Stage 1, you will be informed about how many ECU you earned from the 
adding task; the selected multiplying factor and your total earnings from Stage 1. 
 
STAGE 2 OF EACH ROUND 
Your task in Stage 2 of each round will be to decide how many ECU from your earnings 
in Stage 1 you want to state (from 0 up to your total earnings in Stage 1).  Once you have 
made your decision a deduction fee will be applied. This deduction fee will consist of 
25% of your stated earnings.  
After all participants have made their decisions in Stage 2, you will be informed of your 
stated earnings in Stage 2, the deduction fee applied to you and your final earnings from 
Stage 2.  
 
 
STAGE 3 OF EACH ROUND 
After all individuals have made their decisions in Stage 2, in Stage 3 the computer will 
randomly select, with a probability p (from 0 to 100), some group members. This 
probability p is unknown to all individuals. If the computer selects you, it will check 
whether or not your stated earnings in Stage 2 are equal to your earnings in Stage 1. If 
your stated earnings in Stage 2 were not equal to your earnings in Stage 1, the difference 
between your earnings from Stage 1 and your stated earnings in Stage 2 will be 
subtracted from your earnings. If your stated earnings in Stage 2 are equal to your earning 
in Stage1, no amount will be subtracted from your earnings. Same if the computer does 
not select you.  
 Before you are informed about the result of the computer random check, you will be 
asked to guess the value of the probability p. If your guess is within the interval ±10 of 
the real probability, you will receive 100 ECU extra at the end of the experiment.  
 
YOUR EARNINGS IN STAGE 3 
 
(i) If you WERE NOT selected by the computer:  
Your earnings in Stage 3= Earnings in Stage 1  
– (Stated Earnings in Stage 2)*0.25  
 
(ii) If you WERE SELECTED by the computer & your stated earning in Stage 2 
WERE NOT equal to your earnings in Stage 1:  
 
Your earnings in Stage 3= Earnings in Stage 1  
– (Stated Earnings in Stage 2)*0.25  
– (Earnings in Stage 1 – Stated Earnings in Stage 2) 
 
(ii) If you WERE SELECTED by the computer & your stated earning in Stage 2 
WERE equal to your earnings in Stage 1:  
Your earnings in Stage 3= Earnings in Stage 1  
– (Stated Earnings in Stage 2)*0.25  
 128 
 
After the computer finishes checking stated earnings from the selected individuals in the 
second stage, you will receive the following information about yourself : 
• Whether or not you were selected by the computer;  
• Whether or not your stated earnings in Stage 2 were equal to your earnings in 
Stage 1; and 
• Your total earnings from Stage 3.  
 
The same process will be repeated for a total of 20 rounds.  
At the end of the experiment you will be informed about which round was selected for 
payment; your total earnings in the selected round; whether or not you got the extra 100 
ECU from guessing the probability correctly in the selected round; and your final 
earnings from the experiment. 
 
 
 
The following examples are for illustrative purposes only 
Example 1.  
Stage 1:  
- Suppose that you have got 5 correct answers from the adding task.  
- That means your have earned 2 ECU * 5 = 10 ECU from the adding task.  
- Suppose that the randomly selected factor has been 100.  
- Thus your total earnings from Stage 1 are 10 ECU*100 =1000 ECU.  
Stage 2:  
- Suppose that you state that your earnings are 1000 ECU.  
- Thus your deduction fee will be 250 ECU (1000 ECU*0.25 = 250 ECU).  
- Your earnings from Stage 2 will be 1000 ECU from Stage 1  – 250 ECU 
deduction fee = 750 ECU.   
Stage 3:   
- Suppose the computer selects you. 
- Your stated earnings in Stage 2 were 1000 ECU = your earnings in Stage 1.  
- Your earnings in Stage 3 will be your earnings from Stage 2  = 750 ECU.  
 
 
Example 2.  
 
Stage 1:  
- Suppose that you have got 5 correct answers from the adding task.  
- That means your have earned 2 ECU * 5 = 10 ECU from the adding task.  
- Suppose that the randomly selected factor has been 100.  
- Thus your total earnings from Stage 1 are 10 ECU*100 =1000 ECU.  
Stage 2:  
- Suppose that you state that your earnings are 500 ECU.  
- Thus your deduction fee will be 125 ECU (500 ECU*0.25 = 125 ECU).  
- Your earnings from Stage 2 will be 1000 ECU from Stage 1 – 125 ECU 
deduction fee = 875 ECU. 
Stage 3:   
- Suppose the computer selects you. 
- Your stated earnings in Stage 2 were 500 ECU which are not equal to your 
earnings in Stage 1. 
- Your earnings in Stage 3 will be earnings from Stage 2 – (earnings from Stage 1 
– stated earnings in Stage 2) = 875 ECU – (1000 ECU – 500 ECU) = 375 ECU. 
 
Example 3.  
Stage 1:  
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- Suppose that you have got 5 correct answers from the adding task.  
- That means your have earned 2 ECU * 5 = 10 ECU from the adding task.  
- - Suppose that the randomly selected factor has been 100.  
- Thus your total earnings from Stage 1 are 10 ECU*100 =1000 ECU.  
Stage 2:  
- Suppose that you state that your earnings are 500 ECU.  
- Thus your deduction fee will be 125 ECU (500 ECU*0.25 = 125 ECU).  
- Your earnings from Stage 2 will be 1000 ECU from Stage 1 – 125 ECU 
deduction fee = 875 ECU. 
Stage 3:   
- Suppose the computer does not select you. 
- Your earnings in Stage 3 will be equal to your earnings in Stage 2 = 875 ECU. 
 
 
QUESTIONS TO HELP YOU BETTER UNDERSTAND THE DECISION TASKS 
When everyone has finished reading the instructions, and before the experiment begins, 
we will ask you a few questions regarding the decisions you will make in the experiment. 
The questions will help you understand the calculation of your earnings and ensure that 
you have understood the instructions.  
Please answer these questions on your computer terminal. Please type your answer in the 
box next to the corresponding question. Once everyone has answered all questions 
correctly we will begin the experiment.  
 
 
 
 
